4 Dissertationen und Habilita- tionen / Dissertations and Habilitations

VORTRÄGE 18. DAVO-KONGRESS PAPERS DAVO CONGRESS 2011
Dem Vortrag liegt eine sprachliche und inhaltliche
Analyse türkischer Predigten zugrunde, die als verbindendes
Element einen Bezug zur Schlacht von
Gallipoli im Ersten Weltkrieg aufweisen. Es stellt sich
die Frage, ob und auf welche Weise durch die Vermittlung
eines historischen Ereignisses in religiösen
Predigten Einfluss auf das Nationalbewusstsein der
muslimisch-türkischen Bevölkerung genommen wird.
Dabei spielt das Präsidium für Religionsangelegenheiten
als vorrangiger Herausgeber der Predigten eine
Rolle. Der Einfluss dieses Amtes in Bezug auf die
Bildung einer nationalen Identität durch Identifikation
mit einem die verschiedenen ethnischen Gruppen zusammenführenden
historischen Ereignis wird betrachtet.
Damit eng verknüpft ist auch die Frage nach dem
Symbolgehalt der Schlacht. Das Nationalbewusstsein
wird nach Aussagen der Predigten noch heute als von
der Religion abhängig gesehen: „Der Islam habe die
türkische Nation seit jeher geprägt und stelle bis heute
ihre Seele dar.“ Die Religion trägt auf ihre Weise zur
Stabilisierung des nationalen Bewusstseins bei und
setzt Akzente unter Bezugnahme auf aktuelle politische,
soziostrukturelle und kulturelle Entwicklungen
in der Türkei.
In der Republik, die durch das Prinzip des Laizismus
auf einer Trennung von Staat und Religion basiert,
werden beide Elemente in den Çanakkale-
Predigten bis heute verbunden. Die Autorin verortet
die Predigten zeitlich in der Republikgeschichte und
beleuchtet diese vor dem Hintergrund politischer und
gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungen in der Türkei. So
geht das häufigere Vorkommen dieser Predigten ab
den 1970er Jahren mit einschneidenden Ereignissen
und Transformationsprozessen einher. Bezüge dieser
Art sind seit der Jahrtausendwende in den Çanakkale-
Predigten jedoch nicht mehr direkt feststellbar.
Ali Fathollah-Nejad (Münster/London): Targeted
or Crippling? The Iran Sanctions Regime and its
Effects on Broader Economic Development
The paper looks at the sanctions regime imposed on
Iran, in particular the one put in practice in the course
of the so-called “nuclear crisis”. Pushed mainly by the
United States (U.S.), a number of important economic
and financial sanctions have been decided and implemented,
especially since 2004. These include both
unilateral (by the U.S. and its allies, above all the European
Union) and multilateral measures (those imposed
by the United Nations Security Council since
2006).
The paper sheds light at (1) geo-economic dynamics
of these sanctions in an increasingly multipolar world
and the policies accompanying it and (2) at effects on
the Iranian economy, civil society and power structure.
It has found that while the sanctions are benefiting
a number of international actors, the ramifications
for Iran's civilian economic and civil society are significantly
negative with the current power structure
being even cemented by sanctions.
By addressing the geo-economic costs of the sanctions
regime, the paper points to a significant short-
coming in the literature on Iran sanctions. The paper
is based upon research conducted since 2009.
Ali Fathollah-Nejad (Münster/London): The United
States’ Policy towards Iran under Obama: Why
the Lack of “Change” was not Surprising
With Barack Obama taking office as U.S. president
by 2009, immense hopes have been raised after years
of a lurking threat of war against Iran. The paper analyzes
Iran strategy papers prepared for the new U.S.
administration on how to solve the conflict with Iran.
The specter of the proposed policies ranged from diplomacy
as pretense for legitimating war to normalization
of relations.
Based on an examination of various policy recommendation
papers being prepared by old and also
newly found think-tanks on the Iran question in the
transition period between the Bush II and Obama administrations,
the following categories are identified:
(1) Neoconservatives and liberal hawks favored the
continuation of the “coercive strategy”; (2) mainstream
élite think-tanks argued for a more (but not exclusively)
Realpolitik-based strategy in order to serve
U.S. interests in the region, which they believe have
not been pursued adequately; (3) moderate circles
called for a whole new Iran policy embracing real diplomacy
that would also take Iranian security and
other interests into account.
It is argued that the main cause for the failure of advancement
in the U.S.–Iran stand-off has been the
lack of U.S. strategic clarity.
Hauke Feickert (Bonn): Western Interventions in
Iraq. The British Iraq-Policy from 1914-1922 and
the American Iraq-Policy from 2003-2009. A
Comparison
The paper examined the interventions in Iraq by
comparing the decision-making of British and American
officials. In both cases the governments feared
that Islamist uprisings could destabilize their position
in the Middle East. A show of force in Iraq was recommended
to preempt any disturbance in the important
Persian Gulf area.
However, officials argued on how to reorder the
region and how to govern Iraq. In the British case,
the Foreign Office proposed to cede power to the allied
Arab National Movement. In Baghdad, Civil
Commissioner Arnold Wilson pointed out, that the
movement was inefficient and did not represent the
Shiite population of Iraq. Wilson set up a direct rule
to control and develop Iraq. In the American case,
the Defense Department prepared to empower allied
Iraqis from exile-organizations. The Civil Commissioner
in Baghdad, Paul Bremer, blocked this plan
because he considered the exiles to be incompetent
and non-representative, as there were no Sunnis in
their ranks. Bremer set up a direct rule, which he
considered to be impartial and benevolent.
A close comparison offers important parallels of
Western interests, perceptions and strategies of control.
There are analogies, like the perception of the
adversary as a Paper-tiger, the self-image of a benev-
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