Main trends of research in the social and human ... - unesdoc - Unesco

Economics 29 I
value. They also restricted the operation of marginal utility calculus to the house-
hold only, but did not restrict ‘pure’ economic theory to the theory of value.
Walras also considered problems of production and accumulation relations,
which brought him closer to classical economics, whereas Marshall studied
distribution problems, which brought him nearer to the later epigons of classical
economics.
Eventually, the hedonistic interpretation of utility (understood as ‘pleasure’,
‘satisfaction’, ‘welfare’) was rejected in favour of a praxiological one. It is not
the quality of the goal that is of importance; what matters is that a given aim of
economic activity can be achieved in different degrees. The place of psycholog-
ical considerations is then taken by a ‘logic of rational choice’, which aims at
the maximization of preference.
The first step in the praxiological interpretation of utility was made at the be-
ginning of the century by Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto (and by Benedetto
Croce, in his polemical exchanges with Pareto). A full and consistent praxiolog-
ical interpretation had, however, to await contemporary authors (cf. especially
R. D. G. Allen and J. R. Hicks : ‘A Reconsideration of the Theory Qf Value’ in
Economica, London, 1954; and J. R. Hicks: A Revision of Demand Theory,
Oxford, 1956). A very elaborate theoretical construction was devised which still
seems rather hypothetical; and, as it is practically impossible to verify, econom-
ists tend increasingly to ignore it.
The somewhat sterile (and apparently obsolescent) central problem of mar-
ginalist economics has been considered at length not so much for its substantial
marginal utility theory content as for its multiple methodological consequences.
The main proposition - the striving for the maximization of preferences (profit
in the capitalist enterprise, utility in the household) - has been generalized, and
provided the foundation for an artificial theoretical construction, built up by
deduction. Economics was finally identified with a general theory of efficient
execution (i.e. praxiology) in the works of two eminent contemporary represen-
tatives of the subjectivist school.
In his book, still considered to be the ‘locus classicus from which all discus-
sions begin’,7 Lionel Robbins defines economics as ‘the science which studies
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have
alternative uses’.* He goes on to explain: ‘The conception we have adopted
may be described as analytical. It does not attempt to pick out certain kinds of
behaviour, but focus attention on a particular aspect of behaviour, the form
imposed by the influence of scarcity. It follows from this, therefore, that in so
far as it presents this aspect, any kind of human behaviour falls within the scope
of economic generalizations. We do not say that the production of potatoes is
economic activity and the production of philosophy is not. We say rather that,
in so far as either kind of activity involves the relinquishment of other desired
alternatives, it has its economic aspect. There are no limitations on the subject-
matter of economic science save this’.g An equally radical conception of eco-
nomic theory as a system of deductive propositions which cannot be verified
empirically is to be found in the work of Ludwig von Mises, who defines eco-
nomics as the most developed branch of praxiology.