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Linguistics 443
anticipatory model of the future, have indicated an impeccable, materialistic
way out of this seeming deadlock’ (p. 327). ‘All the observations on the formation
of the organism in its embryology and ontogeny as well as on the phylogenetic
scale show that the organism in its development and activities strives
for the maximum of negentropy compatible with its vital stability. Such a
formulation of the biological “purpose” requires no psychologization’ (p. 328).
‘The biological relevance pushes the indispensable and unavoidable question of
purpose into first place’ (p. 331). The discovered ability of organisms to build
and integrate material codes which reflect the manifold forms of activity and
extrapolative performances from tropisms to the most complex forms of influence
upon the environment enables BernStejn, according to his own assertion,
‘to speak about the goal-directedness, goal-orientation, etc., of any
organism whatever, perhaps starting with the protists’, without risk of sliding
into a supernatural finalism (p. 309).
An even more resolute claim for the autonomous status of the science of life
was expressed by the eminent Harvard biologist, George Gaylord Simpson:
‘The physical sciences have rightly excluded teleology, the principle that the end
determines the means, that the result is retroactively connected to the cause by
a factor of purpose, or that usefulness is in any sense explanatory (162, p. 370).
But in biology it is not only legitimate but also necessary to ask and answer
questions teleological in aspect concerning the function or usefulness to living
organisms of everything that exists and that occurs in them’ (p. 371). Simpson
repeatedly insists that ‘the purposeful aspect of organisms is incontrovertible’
and that the antiteleological reductionism ‘omits the bios from biology’ (161,
p. 86). In an earlier re-examination of teleology, Jonas Salk underscored that
‘living systems require different considerations as compared with non-living
systems; the idea of purpose in living systems is not only relevant but is essential’.
He explains ‘that it is in the nature of the organism to be oriented for the
change that occurs. The intrinsic nature of the organism influences the range
and direction of change that can occur; the change that occurs becomes added
to others, all of which together seem to be “causes” toward which the developing
organism is drawn, and the word “cause” in this context obtains the
philosophical meaning of “end or purpose”’ (152).
Leaning upon the example of scientific astronomy which superseded speculative
astrology, Pittendrigh proposed to substitute ‘teleonomy’ for ‘teleology’
in order to make it clear that ‘the recognition and description of end-directedness’
is freed from undesirable associations with the Aristotelian metaphysical
dogma. The new term carried the idea that all organization recognized as being
characteristic of life ‘is relative and end-directed‘, and that any randomness is
‘the converse of organization’ (139, p. 394). The new term proved to be opportune
go), and, in Monod‘sview, ‘laTdIBonomie, c’est le mot qu’on peut employer
si, par pudeur objective, on prkfkre dviter “finalit6”. Cependant, “tout se passe”
comme si les Etres vivants dtaient structurds, organisb et conditionnds en vue
d‘une fin: la survie de l’individu, mais surtout celle de l’espkce’ (125, p. 9).
Monod describes the central nervous system as ‘the most evolved of teleonomic
structures’ and ventures to interpret the emergence of the superior, specifically