Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Tools of Air Intelligence
tions difficulties were resolved with the gradual advance of Allied armies
eastward and by the development of additional fields. Centralization of
direction for both photoreconnaissance and photointelligence came with the
creation of the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing
(NAPRW) under Lt. Col. Elliot Roosevelt. This arrangement allowed more
effective assignment of priorities to the innumerable requests for support,
reduced overlap of reconnaissance units on the basis of requests from different
ground units, and allowed third-phase interpretation at a CIU established in
Algiers. When NAAF became MAAF in December 1943, the NAPRW became
the Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (MAPRW).’”
When war came to the Pacific in December 1941, the United States had no
designated or properly equipped reconnaissance aircraft, no field laboratory
capability, and no qualified U.S. photointerpreter in the entire region. *’* In the
Southwest Pacific and South Pacific theaters, this scarcity of assets forced the
evolution, largely on an ad hoc basis, of joint photoreconnaissance and
photointerpretation organizations. Such amalgamations as Navy cameras,
Marine photography technicians, and AAF aircraft were common through many
of the early island campaigns.’” In contrast to Europe, the vast size of these
Pacific theaters and the limited facilities at any one location resulted in a more
decentralized structure of command and control and allocation of photointelli-
gence units. At one time, the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron (AAF) headquar-
tered at Guadalcanal maintained detachments at Bougainville, Munda (New
Georgia), and Green Island in the northern Solomons to provide immediate
response to Allied forces operating in these widely separated areas.’3o
The situation in the remote CBI regions was even more elementary. The
first American photoreconnaissance units did not begin operations in either the
China or India-Burma regions until the closing months of 1942-nearly a year
after air operations had begun. Until that time General Chennault’s American
Volunteer Group and China Air Task Force had to rely on jury-rigged
equipment. The India Air Task Force operating in Burma at least had the
advantage of RAF capabilities in India, and American photointerpreters
received training at the RAF school in Karachi.131 A true combined organization
in India came with the creation of the Eastern Air Command’s Photo Recon-
naissance Force in December 1943. This organization, commanded in its first
year by the veteran RAF Group Capt. S. C. Wise, Served the same role as
Roosevelt’s NAPRW. The Combined Photographic Interpretation Centre at
Calcutta performed third-phase interpretation and photographic production.’32
As the war progressed, the initial trend toward centralization of photorecon-
naissance and interpretation assets and units was, to an extent, reversed. In large
part, this shift stemmed from the need to provide timely support for tactical air
and land operations as well as the increasing number of units available by the
spring of 1944. In Europe and the Mediterranean it reflected two other factors.
The first was adifference in American and British philosophies, with the former
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