Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The Pacific and Far East
Throughout the almost four years of conflict in the SPA and SWPA, the AAF
demonstrated a growing skill in collecting air intelligence information from a
wide variety of sources, analyzing the data, and using it in the relentless pursuit
of Japan. In retrospect, much more remains in terms of knowledge of day-to-day
planning and decision-making factors for the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces
than can be seen for any other AAF segment of the Pacific and Far East theaters.
In good measure, this resulted from the combined effects of George Kenney’s
note taking and correspondence with Ennis Whitehead, his longtime, trusted
subordinate. Throughout the fighting, the interplay between air operations and
intelligence was helped by the flow of ULTRA information appearing in the
special intelligence bulletins from GHQ, which highlighted the trends that
seemed either most promising or most dangerous. Application of intelligence
to air planning and to coordinated, joint-force Allied undertakings became
highly sophisticated, able to rapidly consume information on Japanese forces
and quickly apply it. Nonetheless, as shown by Japan’s unexpectedly strong
defense of the Philippines, intelligence could not provide the final answers to
war planning and execution; that could come only from an understanding of
combat and of the enemy, and an awareness of and willingness to take risks.
Risk taking is the essence of warfare, and risk taking was standard practice
in the Southwest Pacific, often promoted by Kenney’s personality. Generally,
Kenney decided his course of action after considerable thought, based on
substantial current operational intelligence data. Beginning in 1943, for
example, Kenney and Whitehead often had a good knowledge of Japanese air
strengths and locations. As a result, when they drew up plans, the chances for
success usually favored the Allied airmen. Success was not always foreor-
dained, however. Neither Kenney nor Whitehead predicted the difficult situation
in the Admiralties that almost backfired on them or the unexpected Japanese
aerial defense at Balikpapan that surprised them. Another surprise was the
Japanese reaction to the Leyte and Mindoro landings as exemplified by the T
Attack Force’s rapid formation and deployment to battle. One of the few times
that George Kenney seems to have had after-the-fact misgivings, as reflected in
his private notes, was over the perhaps too hasty assault on the Admiralties,
although the prize was clearly worth the action. The heavy defense of
Balikpapan caused Kenney concern, and he personally went to talk to and
reassure the bomber aircrews before the final two attacks. In the case of
Balikpapan, the refinery was a worthwhile target, but in going after it he had
judged the absence of radio traffic to be the indicator of weak defenses-it was
not.
The Japanese reaction to the invasion of the Philippines came, as Kenney
said, as a surprise to everyone. Indications from intelligence could not provide
information from an absent source; in this case, the Japanese T Attack Force
formed at the last minute. A hastily cobbled-together fighting unit, the TAttack
Force reacted quickly from a base on Formosa to give the Japanese a strong
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