Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

and Activities in Europe”; memo, ACIAS,
Intelligence, for CAS, subj: Post-Hostilities
Air Intelligence Objectives, Oct 6,
1944, all in 142.04-15.
45. Rprt, Air Staff, “Post-Hostilities
Intelligence Requirements Plan,” n.d.
46. Memos, ACIAS, Intelligence, for
Dep CG, AAF, subj: Daily Activity Report,
Jun 6,1945, and subj: Daily Activity
Report, Jun 15, 1945, 142.0323. See also
the Daily Activity Reports, May 12, 14,
and 24,1945, and the memo from Hodges
to Arnold, in 142.0323. The Daily Activity
Reports may also be found in LC,
Arnold Papers.
47. Memo, Bissell for CG, AAF, subj:
Duplication of Effort in War Department
Scientific Intelligence, May 12, 1945, vol
7, doc 228, 203.6; memo, Arnold to Eaker,
May 22, 1945, in ltr, ACIAS, Mattriel
and Services, to Dir, AAF Air Tech Svcs
Comd, subj: Functions Prescribed for Dr.
Theodore H. von Khntin’s Scientific
Advisory Group by the Commanding
General AAF, Jun 23,1945, vol8, doc 23,
203.6. (The letter quotes in its entirety the
memo describing Arnold’s desires for the
von Khntin’s group. The Arnold memo
can also be found in LC, Arnold Papers,
box 79.) See also Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan:
The Army and the Atomic Bomb
(Washington, D.C., 1985), p. 286.
48. Memo, Arnold to Eaker, Mar 22,
1945.
49. Memo, Hodges to Eaker, subj: AAF
Post Hostilities Intelligence Activities
[late May 19451, 142.04-15. (The best
copy of the document is barely readable;
thus no date can be discerned.)
50. Ltr, Spaatz to Arnold, May 12,
1945, in LC, Arnold Papers, box 115;
draft hist, “Air Technical Intelligence,”
pp. 11-58-1 1-59, 106.19.
51. Ltr, Arnold to LeMay, Jul15,1945,
LC, Arnold Papers, box 11.
52. Ltr, LeMay to Arnold, Jul25,1945,
LC, Arnold Papers, box 11.
53. Norstad intvw, Feb and Oct 1979,
pp. 540-550. Arnold was possessed of a
ferocious temper and an impatience that
knew no bounds, as Norstad so clearly
points out. During the war, Arnold drove
himself so hard that he suffered several
Notes to Pages 372-380
heart attacks. At one point his doctors
removed him to Florida to recover and get
away from business in the Pentagon. See
also ltr, Maj Gen E. R. Quesada to CIAS,
Jul 12, 1945, subj: Discussions between
D’Olier Committee and Joint Target
Group. This letter and the attached “Re-
port on USSBS and JTG Conferences”
laid out the Air Staffs assessment of
Japan’s ability to continue the war. Quesa-
da doubted that Japan could hang on for
long.
54. Ltr, Quesada to CIAS, Jul 12, 1945;
“Report on USSBS and JTG Confer-
ences.”
55. Ltr, Quesada to CIAS, Jull2,1945;
“Report on USSBS and JTG Confer-
ences.”
56. Ltr, Quesada to CIAS, Jul 12,1945;
“Report on USSBS and JTG Confer-
ences.”
57. See Norstad intvw, Feb and Oct
1979, p. 563, for the Arnold-Lovett rela-
tionship. See entries for Jun 1945 in LC,
Kenney Papers, where Lovett describes
the problems and plans for airfield prepa-
ration for the final assault on Japan. See
also ltr, Eaker to Quesada, subj: Intelli-
gence Study, Sun 23,1945, in LC, Arnold
Papers, box 97, and in 142.021-1, as well
as ltr, Maj Francis B. O’Mahoney and
Capt Raymond K. Perkins to ACIAS,
Intelligence, subj: Survey of the Office of
the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelli-
gence, Apr 21, 1945.
58. Memo, Eaker to Asst Secy War for
Air Lovett, subj: Intelligence Study, Jul6,
1945.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.; draft hist, “Air Technical In-
telligence,’’ pp. 11-45-1 1-49.
61. Memo, Eaker to Asst Secy War for
Air Lovett, Jul 6, 1945; draft hist, “Air
Technical Intelligence,” pp. 11 -45-1 1-49.
62. Ltr, Brig Gen Richard C. Lindsay to
Spaatz, subj: USASTAF Intelligence, Jul
7, 1945, in LC, Spaatz Papers, box 11;
memo, Brig Gen Louis J. Fortier, WDGS,
MID, to ACIS, G-2, subj: Survey of Intel-
ligence Activities of Army Air Forces,
Nov 9, 1945, 142.01.
63. Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be
Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project
459