Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
Even before the Northwest African invasion, but closely associated with it,
the Eighth attacked German submarine bases. The battle for the Atlantic had
been a seesaw struggle from the beginning of the war, a struggle that throughout
much of 1942 had gone against the Allies. The decision to launch TORCH only
increased the dire necessity to gain the upper hand. On October 13, 1942,
having just been appointed commander of the Allied invasion force, General
Eisenhower put into written form instructions he had discussed previously with
General Spaatz. Eisenhower’s directive admitted what Spaatz must have
expressed forcefully in previous discussions: “The German Air Force must be
constantly pounded [to gain air superiority].” Nevertheless, no other objective
“should rank above the effort to defeat the German submarine . . . [which] I
consider. . . to be one of the two basic requirements to the winning of the war.”
Accordingly, Spaatz was to initiate “effective action against the submarine ports
in the Bay of Bi~cay.”’~~ Spaatz, in turn, directed VIII Bomber Command to
concentrate its efforts against the German submarine operating bases at Brest,
Saint Nazaire, Lorient, Bordeaux, and La Palli~e.’~~
Eaker had already outlined what he called Plans for Anti-Submarine
Bombing and forwarded them to Spaatz in mid-October. “Without a basic force
of 10 heavy bomber groups,” he wrote, “it would not be possible to deny these
ports to the enemy.”’35 His staff had made an extensive analysis of communications
systems, shed construction, power units, living quarters and other auxiliary
functions which indicated that it would be possible to disrupt critical activities
at these bases to deny the enemy their effective use. According to this study,
since the heavily reinforced concrete pens could not be destroyed, attacks
should concentrate on vital work and support activities located outside the
shelters as well as the locks that controlled movement to and from the protected
pens.’36 The bomber commander admitted these operations had to be considered
an “experiment,” but, he stated, they were ones “we are anxious to undertake.”I3’
In undertaking this campaign, the Eighth’s planners relied heavily on their
Allies for intelligence. Specific target information came primarily from RAF
and Royal Navy photographs and photointerpretation reports as well as reports
from on the scene observers, including pictures smuggled out by the French
~nderground.’~’ Operational intelligence personnel met with representatives of
the Interservice Topographical Section at Oxford for details on geographical
features and with Admiralty officials on building construction within the U-boat
bases, including the super-reinforced concrete ~he1ters.l~’ American planners
also referred to several British studies. The first was a MEW report of July 21,
1942. Based on RAF experiences, this study focused primarily on submarine
construction yards and factories producing submarine component parts, neither
of which it considered particularly attractive targets. The report was similarly
discouraging with regard to U-boat operating bases in western Europe,
estimating that vital activities were or could be protected and that redundant
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