Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
General Hale’s strength was probably increased by the realization that any such
additions could be drained away by the theater commander, if he so desired.
There remained a compelling bureaucratic reason to send qualified intelligence
officers and men to other locations where they could have a more direct and
continuing effect on Air Force operations.61
Despite the troubles, the Seventh contributed substantial operational air
intelligence to the Gilbert Islands campaign as photoreconnaissance aircraft
overflew Japanese-occupied islands, recording enemy positions and activities.
Aerial reconnaissance by the Seventh’s B-24 crews provided information
crucial to Admiral Nimitz’s planning for the Marshall Islands campaign. When
photographs showed that the Japanese had failed to adequately fortify
Kwajalein and Eniwetok, those islands instead of the more heavily protected
Wotje and Maloelap became the targets of amphibious landings. Nimitz’s bold
stroke into the center of the Marshalls group succeeded after extensive
bombardment by Seventh Air Force B-24~.~~
For the taking of the Gilbert Islands, code named Operation GALVANIC, the
Seventh’s bomber force became Task Group 57.2, commanded by Hale, and the
fighters became part of Task Group 57.4, the Ellice Defense and Utility Group,
under Marine Brig. Gen. L. G. Merritt. Hale’s bombers neutralized Japanese
airfields on Tarawa and Makin Islands and made photoreconnaissance missions
in support of Task Force (TF) 57’s commander, Vice Adm. John H. Hoover.
Other targets selected to prevent significant Japanese interference with
GALVANIC were Kwajalein, Maloelap, Mille, and Jaluit. Tactical intelligence
to support these missions came from the Seventh’s A-2, who compiled maps,
aerial photographs, and weather information and passed on information from the
headquarters of Admirals Nimitz and Hoover.63
Continuing AAF expressions of concern for the integrity of Seventh Air
Force led in 1944 to an alteration of the command arrangement in the Central
Pacific. On May 1, Nimitz created TF 59 which comprised all shore-based
aircraft in the forward area except for the Army and Navy transport commands.
Hale assumed the command of TF 59, simultaneously becoming also COMAIR-
FORWARD; he relinquished command of the Seventh, which then fell to Brig.
Gen. Robert W. Douglas, Jr. These changes gave the AAF partial operational
control of its assets, although TF 59 remained a subordinate part of Admiral
Hoover’s TF 57. Although the Navy in the Pacific still controlled Hale’s force,
the change allowed Hale a greater degree of operational direction of his men.
The small-island targets, widely scattered across thousands of miles of ocean,
and Nimitz’s overall strategy frustrated Hale’s ambitions and limited the AM’S
practical application of intelligence data developed both in Honolulu and by the
Seventh’s own reconnaissance
On August 1, 1944, to prepare for the arrival of B-29s in the Pacific, the
War Department created Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Area (AAFPOA). The
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