Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
spanned the spectrum of air operations including photoreconnaissance and
photointerpretation, technical intelligence, and interrogation of air POWs. The
British influence within MAAF intelligence was reflected in the arrangements
for handling ULTRA. Until the summer of 1944, Hull was the only American
officer in A-2 cleared for ULTRA. In May 1944, the target subsection at HQ
MAAF (Adv.) had no American officers indoctrinated to receive and handle
ULTRA.”
In general, the MAAF intelligence office was primarily concerned with
information accumulation and dissemination in the form of digests, appreciations,
and special reports, rather than with analyzing intelligence for operational
decision making, which was primarily done at the next lower level.30
Given the emphasis on targeting, particularly in relation to the interdiction
campaign, it is not surprising that photoreconnaissance and photointerpretation
assumed a high priority at all levels of Mediterranean air commands. An ULTRA
observer in the summer of 1944 evaluated photoreconnaissance as “probably the
most valuable source” of intelligence in this theater because it could advise on
what targets to hit and assess the effectiveness of subsequent strikes. ULTRA not
only could provide assistance on where to take aerial photographs, but often it
could “enable one to exercise superior wisdom” in reading photos?l
The MAPRW, composed of Allied photoreconnaissance units and
commanded by American Col. Karl Polifka, performed reconnaissance missions
for all operational commands at the beginning of 1944. Before he departed the
theater in January 1944, George McDonald, NAAF’s A-2, had also established
the Mediterranean Photo Interpretation Centre. Under HQ MAAF intelligence,
the center contained land and air representatives who met regularly to establish
policy and determine priorities for photoreconnaissance. As an indication of the
expanded demands imposed by both air and land forces on photoreconnaissance
and photointerpretation, the Mediterranean Photo Interpretation Centre
eventually serviced as many as 120 distinct organization^.^'
The SIGINT section at HQ MAAF had been formed originally as part of the
MAC in March 1943 to control and direct all air organizations engaged in
intercepting, processing, and distributing intelligence gathered from enemy lowgrade
SIGINT, radar, and navigational aids. American SIGINT units in the
Mediterranean by spring 1944 included the 849th Company, Signal Intelligence
Service, U.S. Army, and the 16th Reconnaissance Squadron, USAAF, whose
mission was to fly the ferret aircraft to locate and intercept enemy radar and
navigation aids for Allied exploitation. Operational flying units received
SIGINT directly from a nearby signals unit or from the central MAAF signal
intelligence section, which directly transmitted low-grade intelligence to a
specific unit and issued periodic general and special reports.33
The air headquarters most intimately involved in the overall planning of
interdiction operations was the MATAF. Because the tactical commands-XI1
TAC and Desert Air Force-worked directly with their respective land
180