Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Early Intelligence Organization
extensive offensive air strikes could be implemented, by November 1918 the
AEF had developed target folders on such systems as railroad stations and
switching yards, manufacturing plants, and billeting areas and supply dumps in
Germany. Compilation and distribution of this information was primarily the
responsibility of the Bomb Target Section, which also monitored the results of
Allied and American bombing attacks and the location of enemy barrage
balloons, AA batteries, and searchlights. Some of the section’s work was quite
sophisticated. Referring to an analysis of railroad systems behind enemy lines,
for example, its report noted: “Narrow-gauge roads, main lines and railway
centers were observed, to determine at which points [the] most damage could
be done. Photographs were taken, maps made and statistics compiled on the
amount and importance of traffic going through various centers. When
complete, this information was sent to operations officers . . . and after they had
made their decisions, maps and photographs of the targets decided upon were
sent to the bombing squadrons which were to carry out the raids.”lX In sum, by
the end of the war airmen could see a requirement for intelligence to contribute
to the effective preparation and conduct of air operations that might or might
not be immediately tied to ground force activities.
Air Intelligence in the 1920s
For the postwar Air Service, the organizational struggles over responsibility for
air intelligence began with the Army Reorganization Act of 1920. This
legislation generally reflected the desire of General Pershing, who had become
Chief of Staff in 1919, to organize U.S. Army headquarters in Washington
along the lines of the wartime AEF. The WDGS now included five divisions:
Personnel (G-l), Military Intelligence (G-2), Operations and Training (G-3),
Supply (G-4), and War Plans. Theoretically coequal, the chiefs of all the offices
were brigadier generals, except for the G-2 who was generally a colonel.
The duties of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2), included the
requirement to support the War Plans Division (WPD) in strategic planning and
to provide War Department intelligence to field commanders at the outbreak of
hostilities. In postwar reductions, the MID of G-2 was cut to 25 officers and 52
civilians by 1924, where it would remain until modestly increased in 1940. The
number of military and assistant military attaches dropped drastically from a
high of 94 in November 1918. In spite of the rapid expansion and growth of
aviation, the War Department usually authorized Air Service officers as
assistant military attach& only in London, Paris, and Rome.”
The Air Corps Act of 1926 provided additional representation for air
matters on the WDGS. A new G-2 Air Section (shortly elevated to the more
important status of a branch) was responsible for policy matters and questions
pertaining to the use of Air Corps personnel in combat intelligence, aerial
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