Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Early Intelligence Organization
include the breadth and depth of information required, nor the ramifications of
obtaining and evaluating it; this became obvious once strategic bombing
operations begah in 1942.
At the very least, the prewar American military intelligence apparatus was
clearly inadequate. The intelligence structure could not acquire the type of
infomation required for the theories of strategic air operations that airmen had
advanced and planned for in such key documents as AWPD-1. Obtaining
relevant data became even more difficult once hostilities commenced.
Moreover, as the war years would demonstrate, the question of who was best
qualified to evaluate that information, and thus be in a position to affect both
planning and operations, was not nearly so simple as airmen had believed in the
1930s.
Finally, any assessment of the American Amy’s air intelligence prior to
Pearl Harbor, and the effect of that intelligence on plans and preparations, must
confront obvious flaws in the assessment of soon-to-be enemies. Because they
assumed that potential foes would develop forces for the same purposes and
employ them in the same manner as they themselves, military and civilian
observers misread capabilities and intentions of both the Japanese and the
German Air Forces. How successfully and how quickly these problems in
intelligence-whether organizational, procedural, or interpretive-could be
corrected would directly affect the ability of the AAF to conduct the air war
after Pearl Harbor.
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