Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Planning the Defeat of Japan
from Germany was so fast that the AAF’s specialists in Europe and at Wright
Field found it impossible to absorb and study all that they received!6
As the previously mentioned studies were underway, at least two other
major study groups turned up in Germany seeking information. One was the von
KhmAn mission, a pet endeavor of Arnold’s led by the chief of his Scientific
Advisory Group, Dr. Theodore von K h h . This group had been charged by
Arnold to “think in terms of developments to be anticipated over 20 years and
thus provide guidance to AAF as to goals to be achieved.” As Arnold noted, von
-An and his people were to observe, correlate, and draw conclusions from
all possible enemy developments, those in being or under consideration. Von
UrmAn’s group had no intelligence analysis charter as such, but by the very
nature of their work they would deal in such matters. When the von K h h
team members arrived in Europe in May 1945, they ran into another group, Maj.
Gen. Clayton Bissell’s ALSOS mission.* Bissell had dispatched the ALSOS
mission from G-2 to carry out a number of the War Department’s scientific
intelligence goals, but the primary purpose was to ferret out as much information
as possible about Germany’s atomic energy development. In addition, the
group was to find all available records on enemy scientific research and
development, especially those with a military application. This included
aeronautical research, but the AAF was not represented on the mission’s staff.47
Not only were the two teams surprised to find each other making similar
inquiries, but an inevitable clash quickly found its way to Washington when the
von K h h group, assisted by Spaatz’s representatives, tried to lay claim to
material unearthed by the ALSOS team. As a further complication, the U.S. Navy
and the British voiced legitimate claims to the German secrets. Arnold
instructed his deputy, Eaker, who had recently moved to the new job in
Washington, to settle the problem, but to be careful how he did it. Arnold was
explicit in stating that he did not object to joint work, nor did he want the Amos
and von KhnAn teams consolidated. He wanted von KArmh’s conclusions and
recommendations sent directly to AAF headquarters-von UnnAn’s work was
not to be commingled with either ALSOS or AT1 reports. Arnold did not object
to facts jointly developed being jointly reported. Under no circumstances,
however, was any information “which definitely discloses our intentions and
programs for future air research and development” to be disclosed to anyone
outside of Arnold’s Washington domain!* Whatever course of action the AAF
was to take in postwar operations and development, Arnold wanted it decided
by the air leaders first. Arnold seems to have feared that premature disclosure
*ALSOS was a cover name for the mission, not an acronym. The team was to
determine the extent and success of Germany’s nuclear research and to locate other
significant scientific intelligence data. Few people knew of the AMOS mission’s
existence.
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