Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
to construction yards, were not taken primarily on intelligence assessments. The
seriousness of the crisis, perhaps the most serious of the war for the western
Allies, provided the justification for these diversions. Assessments made before
and after the attacks demonstrated the uncertain nature of intelligence and the
problems of evaluating what one sees, let alone of projecting what might
happen. Clearly, there was no consensus on the impact, actual or potential, of
these attacks. In no small way, this was a problem that affected strategic air
operations throughout the war: inherent difficulties involved not only assessing
physical damage but also interpreting the impact this damage had on the
capability of the target. Finally, the submarine campaign, especially during its
early months, proved once again that intelligence, even when correct, could not
fully compensate for the lack of adequate operational capability. All of the
studies suggested that the level of air attacks needed was simply impossible
with the resources available to VIII Bomber Command.
Countering the German Air Force
While U-boats remained the top air priority for the Combined Chiefs until the
spring of 1943, they never had that status for American airmen, either in
Washington or in England. For Americans, the objective of strategic air power
was to destroy German industrial and military capability through daylight, high-
altitude, precision attacks on the German homeland. Since the chief obstacle to
accomplishing this objective was the GAF, it stood at the top of every AAF
target priority list.* According to the Director of Intelligence, USSTAF, “it was
always the first duty of Air Intelligence to know accurately the strength,
disposition and capabilities of the G.A.F.”’56 Reflecting this importance, Eighth
Air Force intelligence (later USSTAF) published a weekly special report
focused solely on Axis air forces. As they set out to prove their doctrine of
strategic air power, American airmen seriously misjudged the capabilities and
potential strength of their opponents.
In an August 1942 report to General Spaatz summarizing the first four
B-17 missions-all shallow penetrations into France-Eaker confidently
asserted, “I am now thoroughly convinced . . . successful bombing operations
can be conducted beyond the range of fighter pr~tection.”’~’ Four months later,
Eaker, now Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, forwarded to Arnold a
study on the GAF compiled by his intelligence section. Thisereport, he declared,
“shows . . . quite clearly, that this all-conquering, all-powerful monster, the
G.A.F., has passed its peak and is now on the way downhill.” Responding to
Arnold’s concern that the Germans might mass 1,200 aircraft in North Africa
*Although Lujiwaffe was the official name for the German Air Force during the
war, Allied documents generally referred to it by the acronym “GAF” or “G.A.F.”
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