Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
bombardment of targets throughout Germany, Allied air forces effectively
reduced jet fighter production to negligible proportions.281
The impact of these mortal blows appeared in a recommendation by
McDonald to General Anderson in mid-March 1945. Reviewing the GAF’s
response to daylight bombing since the first of the year, the intelligence director
noted that of 55 heavy bomber missions, only 13 had met any reaction; 33
bombers were confirmed as lost to enemy fighters, either conventional or jet.
The latest reports suggested that the Germans, who had moved more than half
their conventional fighters to the eastern front in January, could devote no more
than 125 Me 262s to defensive operations before the end of April. Even those
would be unable to concentrate because of fuel shortages and installation
damages.282 In marked contrast to his previous emphasis on the requirement for
strong escort support, which he had argued only a few months before was the
only reason American bombers could continue deep raids, McDonald now
recommended Eighth Air Force fighters could be better employed for “more
direct cooperation with the ground forces.”283
Shortly thereafter, the Jockey Committee in its final meeting concluded the
GAF was no longer a worthwhile target.284 On April 16, 1945, Spaatz directed
that in the absence of appropriate strategic targets, American strategic air forces
would operate in support of the advancing Allied armies. Three weeks later
Germany surrendered.
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