Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
heavily involved in the neutralization of Axis air power and in interdiction.
NASAF was already directing its full attention across the Mediterranean when
the Axis forces in Tunisia surrendered in May 1943. Since operations in support
of HUSKY involved targets long since made familiar in repeated attacks, the role
of intelligence was to focus on those targets most directly related to the coming
invasion.’
On June 4, 1943, the air intelligence section of Force 141 (the planning
organization for HUSKY) prepared a paper for NAAF‘s A-2 entitled “Bombing
of Communications-(In Support of Army Operations).” The paper focused on
the vulnerable points in Sicily’s road and railway systems, whose destruction
would delay enemy movements during the assault phase. It contained a detailed
discussion of individual targets with maps and annotated photograph^.^ Using
this information, updated primarily by photoreconnaissance and Y intercepts,
NASAF and Ninth Air Force flew between June 18 and 30 almost 1,000 sorties
against supply areas, terminal ports, and marshaling yards in Sicily and along
the west coast of Italy, as well as in Sardinia and Cor~ica.~
Allied commanders and their planners believed command of the air was a
prerequisite to a successful assault on Sicily. Air intelligence had not only to
determine the strength and capability of the opposing force, but also to suggest
how best to defeat it. Estimates of Axis air strength fluctuated in the week3
preceding the invasion. The original plan for HUSKY, prepared in March 1943,
assumed a total Lufbvufle force of 1,200 aircraft in the theater by the end of
April, of which some 840 would be in the Sicily-Sardinia-Pantelleriaregion. By
May, estimates stood at 695 in the central Mediterranean area. A week before
the landing, the air intelligence staff of the British JIC, using ULTRA-provided
figures, arrived at an estimate of 990 German aircraft when, in fact, there were
960. Based primarily on low-grade SIGINT, the British accurately assessed an
Italian strength of approximately 700 aircraft of all types5 To assist in the
reduction of this threat, NAAF intelligence in May identified “the principal
targets (i.e., airfields, assembly points, and factories) which, if destroyed, would
contribute to the neutralization of the enemy air force operating in Italy,
Sardinia, and Sicily.”6 The targets NASAF bombers and fighter-bombers struck
over the next three months coincided with those laid out in the intelligence
study, modified daily throughout the course of Operation HUSKY as new
information became available.
To prepare for HUSKY, the Allies established a small combat intelligence
staff to handle only the most critical intelligence aspects at a combined
MAC-NAAF command post at La Marsa. The monitoring of the Axis air forces
during HUSKY provides an excellent example of how an intelligence picture can
be built up through a coordination of its constituent parts. According to Group
Captain Humphreys, the chief intelligence officer of MAC, who headed the
command post intelligence unit, “‘U’ kept us very fully informed of. . . [the]
frequent re-dispersal of G.A.F. units.” At the same time, he stressed, “the very
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