Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
entered the war, air intelligence was needed for two types of air warfare: tactical
and strategic. Tactical, or operational, air intelligence analysts working in the
war theaters had to locate opposing enemy forces and attempt to define their
size, combat capability, technology, and tactics. Analysts had to locate targets
for the tactical air units that would support the plans of the joint air-ground or
air-sea operations commander.
Strategic intelligence, similar in principle to its tactical counterpart, also
required seeking, analyzing, and disseminating information beyond that needed
to support the direct clash of opposing forces. In pursuing the Allies’ World
War I1 military aims, strategic air intelligence analysts attempted to identify
German, Italian, and Japanese national war-making resources that could most
effectively be attacked by a limited strategic bomber force. These intelligence
studies also attempted to establish priorities to guide destruction of target
groups as diverse as petroleum refining and distribution, transportation, aircraft
assembly, and steel production. Despite the substantial and growing effort that
airmen applied to this problem, target categories and priorities could not always
be clearly defined, or agreed upon; uncertainty over what was critical to the
enemy’s wartime economy could never be completely eliminated.
Once the analytical process was reasonably complete, the information had
to be imparted to commanding officers so that they might decide how best to
concentrate and use the available air power. Air commanders, for a variety of
reasons, might or might not be willing to accept an intelligence assessment. The
intelligence officers identified the targets they believed should and could be
attacked. But the capabilities of opposing air defenses could not always be
determined precisely, and evidence to support any assessment had to be
convincing. Many commanders exhibited a natural reluctance to accept
another’s suggestions or recommendations because a decision that proved
wrong in combat could be disastrous to their command and career. Ego
sometimes intervened, making it difficult for a commander to accept ideas
counter to his preconceived notions. For intelligence officers, whether stationed
in Washington, Europe, or the Far East, the first important task usually involved
gaining the trust of the senior officer they served. Only then could their work
begin to influence planning and operations.
To be effective, intelligence analysts had to produce information that was
timely and useful to a commander. No matter how perceptively drawn the
intelligence officers’ observations might be, delay in preparation or dissemina-
tion could mean that an operations planning staff received the information too
late. Adjusting to new demands for intelligence and learning to use intelligence
products to best advantage did not always come quickly or easily to the AAF’s
officer corps.
Adding to the challenge, on December 7, 1941, the United States armed
forces had no effective central intelligence organization responsible for
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data about enemies or potential
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