Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
and assessment had “a certain cohesion and single-mindedness of purpose that
is totally lacking in Wa~hington.”~’ The most nettlesome problem that Eaker
saw in Washington was the JCS’s decision in 194.4 to fragment intelligence
responsibilities among the services. His statement that the British system was
intrinsically more effective than the one in America was difficult to prove, but
it was a good way to approach the question. What made the British system so
responsive, Eaker believed, was its tremendous signals intercept and photointerpretation
capabilities so near the fighting, readily available to the military and
naval commanders. Eaker and Quesada pointed out that the Pentagon was 7,000
miles from the Pacific fighting and that the Americans had always had a paucity
of information about the Japanese. This lack of data made it very difficult to
assess targets or predict Japanese reactions to bombing. It was not possible, they
contended, for the system in Japan to ever be as good as the one in Europe had
been. This argument, as far as air power went, applied mostly to strategic air.
Kenney and Nimitz had excellent operational air intelligence. The air war over
Japan was soon to become more tactical than strategic with the projected
November 1 invasion of the Japanese home islands. In answering Lovett’s
questions, Eaker and Quesada hit again on one of the AAF’s continuing
concerns: subordination of the air to the ground army, in this case, of A-2 to
G-2.59
The two generals contended that the AAF had been enjoined from gathering
primary intelligence information, except for photography. Worse, but carefully
worded for security reasons, G-2 controlled ULTRA analyses and decrypts,
giving the Air Staff only finished studies, not the information from which the
reports had been drawn nor information from which air analysts might reach
other conclusions. The memo to Lovett stated, “In some cases, G-2 only gives
us ‘evaluated’ information, i.e. conclusions deduced from unknown facts, and
restricts us rigidly in the way we use these conclusions.”60 Air attach& were
likewise controlled by the War Department, not the AAF, and their effectiveness
suffered as a result. Eaker and Quesada opined hat many of these
deficiencies could be offset by the experience gained in Europe; they also
proposed a realigned intelligence office, able to concentrate on the tasks
allowed them by the Joint Chiefs and to have in place an air intelligence
operation comparable to the Air Ministry in London and capable of supporting
an independent air force, should one be organized after the war. As a follow-on
to the reorganization, Eaker’s letter told Lovett that sufficient intelligence
officers from Europe were in training in Florida and at Lmgley, Virginia, for
the Pacific war and for use as posthostility intelligence experts. The latter claim
regarding training was true on its face, but was a misconception on Eaker’s part.
Many of the officers who came to the intelligence training from Europe had
been of the impression they were on their way home; others had no interest in
participating in yet another war in a far-off place of indeterminate length and
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