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Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

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Building an <strong>Air</strong> Intelligence Organization<br />

ated <strong>the</strong> old OCAC and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> Combat Command into HQ AAF.<br />

Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> intelligence functions of both <strong>the</strong>se groups were transferred to<br />

<strong>the</strong> office of <strong>the</strong> AC/AS, Intelligence, also referred to as A-2.*’* To perform his<br />

responsibilities to collect, evaluate, and disseminate air intelligence, <strong>the</strong> AC/AS<br />

was provided an A-2 staff and a subordinate <strong>Air</strong> Intelligence Service (AIS)<br />

which reported to <strong>the</strong> AC/AS through its director. The A-2 staff was to<br />

establish policy and provide overall guidance on air intelligence functions<br />

within <strong>the</strong> AAF. AIS would serve as <strong>the</strong> operating agency to collect, evaluate,<br />

and disseminate tactical and o<strong>the</strong>r air intelligence, develop training programs<br />

for air intelligence people, and operate air security services. By June 1942,210<br />

officers were assigned to air intelligence duties under <strong>the</strong> AC/AS, Intelligence.”<br />

Despite pressures on all agencies to reduce <strong>the</strong> number of people in <strong>the</strong><br />

Washington area, AC/AS, Intelligence continued to expand. Upon his<br />

assignment as <strong>the</strong> A-2 in June 1942, Col. Edgar P. Sorenson argued for an<br />

additional 58 people. It was not enough, he explained, for his organization to<br />

depend upon intelligence sent to it; his staff also had to seek out information<br />

from <strong>the</strong> many agencies in Washington that had useful data. In <strong>the</strong> summer of<br />

1942, A-2 officers made a weekly average of 437 contacts with 25 different<br />

Washington agencies. In <strong>the</strong> Informational Intelligence Division, for example,<br />

only 25 percent of <strong>the</strong> products it prepared came from information automatically<br />

sent to it. At <strong>the</strong> same time, Sorenson noted, manpower shortages prevented <strong>the</strong><br />

accomplishment of tasks vital to <strong>the</strong> operating commands. The Operational<br />

Intelligence Division had completed only half of a schedule calling for 361<br />

objective folders for all <strong>the</strong>aters. Under <strong>the</strong> threat of a severe impairment in<br />

targeting at acritical juncture, Sorenson got <strong>the</strong> 58 additional officers (including<br />

4 officers for an AAF <strong>Historical</strong> Section added to A-2 in June 1942).”<br />

The division of responsibilities between <strong>the</strong> A-2 staff and AIS reflected <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong>n-current AAF approach of separating policy and operating functions. This<br />

philosophy proved more appropriate in <strong>the</strong>ory than in practice, and shortly <strong>the</strong><br />

decentralized structure evolved into a much more centralized one. The division<br />

proved especially burdensome for air intelligence; <strong>the</strong> A-2’s office was with <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Air</strong> Staff in <strong>the</strong> Munitions Building, and <strong>the</strong> AIS was at Gravelly Point, near <strong>the</strong><br />

Washington, D.C., municipal airport. As part of yet ano<strong>the</strong>r AAF reorganiza-<br />

tion, in March 1943 all air intelligence functions were telescoped into <strong>the</strong> office<br />

of <strong>the</strong> AC/AS, Intelligence, where <strong>the</strong>y fell into five principal divisions:<br />

Operational Intelligence, Informational Intelligence, Counter Intelligence,<br />

Combat Training and Liaison, and <strong>Historical</strong>.” The March 1943 reorganization<br />

also established a Special Projects section supposedly to focus on <strong>the</strong> develop-<br />

ment of amore professional and realistic intelligence staff operation. Under <strong>the</strong><br />

*During <strong>the</strong> four years of war <strong>the</strong>re would be eight different Assistant Chiefs<br />

of <strong>Air</strong> Staff for Intelligence.<br />

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