Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
capability for a concentrated thrust. By that time in the war, however, Allied
strength was such that Japan’s defeat was virtually certain. The Allies,
understanding that they were in a hard fight nevertheless, were bolstered by the
fact that the potential consequences arising from a miscalculation were far less
than would have been the case in 1943.
Assessing the Watchers: The Allied View of Japanese
Air Intelligence
Allied intelligence specialists were not alone in scrutinizing their enemy,
although the Japanese did it much differently and with less emphasis. One of the
tasks for Allied air intelligence was to watch this enemy effort and remain alert
to both its imperfections and the implications of its successes. Air commanders
could then assess the threat that Japanese intelligence presented to their own
operations. Fortunately for the Allies, the Japanese, especially the Imperial
Japanese Army, had traditionally discounted the value of intelligence analyses,
its officers preferring the show of bravado associated with offensive warfare.
The tendency of Japanese Army leaders was to dismiss intelligence as having
negligible importance. The thinking of these men was colored by admiration of
German military tactics, their own arrogance, and a general disdain for military
forces of all Western nations except Germany.89
An example of the state of Japan’s air intelligence at the beginning of the
Pacific War was her lack of knowledge of Great Britain’s military posture in the
prized colony of Malaya. On November 22, 1941, sixteen days before the
beginning of hostilities, Lt. Col. Tsuji Masanobu, chief of Lt. Gen. Yamashita
Tomoyuki’s Operations Planning Staff, personally overflew British installations
in Northern Malaya. Tsuji had to make the trip because he lacked adequate
maps to plan the campaign. The size and development of the bases he saw on
his flight caused him to recommend substantial changes to the Twenty-fijih
Army’s plans. As a result, the Japanese reinforced their Army Air Force units
intended for the attack. They then quickly captured Kota Bharu and Alor Star
once hostilities began in order to deprive the RAF of major operating sites. One
can only commend Tsuji’s initiative and accomplishments, but the very fact that
Yamashita’s senior planner had to make the flight himself spoke poorly of the
Japanese Army’s grasp of the importance of air and ground intelligence
organization. After the initial Japanese victories, its army had learned little. In
early 1942, Southern Army headquarters, then in Singapore, saw little reason to
keep the capability it had, merging the intelligence section into and making it
a minor part of the operations staff.w
The AAF in the Pacific and Far East did not, however, face an entirely
inadequate enemy intelligence structure. The Japanese used sources and
methods similar to those used by the Allied organizations, including coast
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