Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
October 14th attack has been considered by many the nadir of the American
strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Looking back in May 1945, the
staff of the Eighth Air Force directorate of intelligence concluded, “On 14
October 1943, the Eighth temporarily lost air superiority in the major target
areas of Germany.”” Four years later the official Air Force history of the war
concurred in almost the same words.86 Senior leaders at the time certainly did
not see it that way. In a cable to Arnold the day after the battle, Eaker admitted
losses had been heavy, but he said, “there is no discouragement here. We are
convinced that when the totals are drawn yesterday’s losses will be far
outweighed by the value of the enemy material destroyed.” As to the day being
a defeat in the air, Eaker argued that the mission “does not represent disaster.
It does indicate that the air battle has reached its climax. . . . We must continue
the battle with unrelenting fury.”” Eaker was not alone in his assessment.
Arnold cabled back his belief the GAF had been backed into a corner. George
Marshall, a man not given to easy praise, wired Eaker, “I like the tone of your
message. No great battle is won without heavy fighting and inevitable
Eaker and the other senior leaders based their optimism on a variety of
intelligence indicators. The first-strike analysis of photographs taken during the
attack led the Eighth Air Force staff to conclude that 75 percent of the target had
been destroyed.” Eaker wrote another letter to Arnold declaring that unless the
photographs “are very deceiving, we shall find the three ballbearing factories
at Schweinfurt are out of business for a long, long time.’’w The initial CIU
analysis, also based on strike photos, noted that the brunt of the attack “fell
solidly on the target area,” with at least 100 hits in the main complex. Smoke
and fires, however, prevented analysts from making overall damage assess-
ments.” Following a reconnaissance flight over the target area five days after
the attack, a second CIU report identified “very heavy and concentrated
damage” within all three factories and assorted other buildings, as well as heavy
damage to adjacent marshaling yards.” More conservative than the American
analysts, who believed overall German ball-bearing production had been cut by
40 percent, a JIC report concluded the attacks on Schweinfurt would probably
result in a 15 to 20 percent decline in supplies over the next six month^.'^
The Allied failure to reattack quickly enough (in this case, the result of a
long stretch of bad weather, overly optimistic assessments of damage, and
operational limitations) allowed the Germans to recover. The Allies had
misinterpreted the reserves available to the Germans and their ability to draw
upon alternative sources in Sweden and Switzerland. Despite the massive
external damage, only some 10 percent of the critical machine tools within were
severely damaged. The survival of the enemy’s equipment and the respite
force. On October 14, Eighth Air Force lost another 60 bombers with 128 others
damaged from an initial force of 320. Some 640 crewmen were killed, seriously
wounded, or missing.
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