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Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

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<strong>Piercing</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Fog</strong><br />

Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle<br />

original German sender put into an Enigma message. If <strong>the</strong> latter was inaccurate<br />

or incomplete, so too was ULTRA. Sometimes originators were deliberately<br />

inaccurate; more often intercepted messages were incomplete ei<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

content or in <strong>the</strong>ir assessment of a situation!’<br />

ULTRA was incomplete in <strong>the</strong> sense that BP, for all its excellence, could not<br />

intercept every German Enigma signal, and many of <strong>the</strong> signals that it did<br />

intercept were incomplete or could be only partially deciphered. While <strong>the</strong><br />

number of signals BP sent to <strong>the</strong> field rose significantly between 1943 and<br />

1944, what it presented often resembled a jigsaw puzzle with at least some<br />

pieces missing. Sometimes <strong>the</strong> available pieces were sufficient by <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />

to recreate <strong>the</strong> total picture. More often, <strong>the</strong> blanks could be filled in only by<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r sources or extrapolated on <strong>the</strong> basis of what was available. Increasing <strong>the</strong><br />

difficulty of this exploitation, particularly with regard to <strong>the</strong> enemy’s intentions,<br />

was <strong>the</strong> fact that BP only rarely intercepted communications between senior<br />

enemy headquarters and among senior commanders. Most Enigma signals<br />

contained information that related to activities or orders representing only<br />

portions of an overall operation or reorganization.<br />

The role of <strong>the</strong> intelligence officers in Hut 3 was crucial, for <strong>the</strong>y<br />

determined <strong>the</strong> initial value of a given message and prepared <strong>the</strong> signals to<br />

operational commands. Not every message was forwarded to all headquarters.<br />

The typical message leaving Hut 3 contained <strong>the</strong> English translation of <strong>the</strong><br />

German text (with emendations explaining missing words or sections) for a<br />

field commander’s consideration. Also on <strong>the</strong> message would be, whenever<br />

possible, notations putting <strong>the</strong> text into <strong>the</strong> context of previous intercepts, such<br />

as <strong>the</strong> state of <strong>the</strong> known German command organization, supply arrangement,<br />

or <strong>the</strong> like. Not all of <strong>the</strong> SSOs assigned to air headquarters agreed about <strong>the</strong><br />

sufficiency of what <strong>the</strong>ir headquarters received. Some SSOs appear to have<br />

72

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