Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
need for AGFRTS and his fears that it would no longer furnish the information
and services his airmen had for so long put to good use. Chennault closed by
asking, rather petulantly, for the return to his command of those people from the
Fourteenth who originally staffed AGFRTS the year before and who now
wanted to leave the OSS.53
Despite the troubles that arose with the new command arrangement in
China, the relationship beteen the Naval Group China, AGFRTS, and the
Fourteenth Air Force continued to yield information upon which commanders
could make decisions. Chennault also had alternate sources on which to rely as
the war entered its final months. To apply greater pressure on the Japanese, and
to make militarily valueless the areas they occupied, the Fourteenth Air Force
engaged in a campaign to destroy railroads. The impetus for the effort came
originally from the JTG in Washington. In one of its first projects related to the
Fourteenth, the JTG assessed both the economic and military impact of a
railroad interdiction campaign in China. Concluding that the Japanese used
large areas of China proper (excluding Manchuria) as a source of raw materials,
the group decided that any effort to attack scattered quarries, mines, and
agricultural collection points would not be economically worthwhile. On the
other hand, certain rail lines provided the bulk of military transportation for
Japan’s army in China, especially south of the Yangtze River. The JTG
recommended dividing the Chinese rail system into different zones and then
concentrating air attacks within selected zones on railway lines, bridges, and
other facilities upon which the Japanese depended. Such tactics would make
repairs very difficult. When one zone’s rail lines were out, the effort would
target another. The first railways recommended for saturation attacks were those
from Peking to Hangkow, from Tientsin to Pukow, and from Tatung to Puchow.
The group’s members reasoned that if these lines, which had heavy military use,
were destroyed, lateral and ancillary lines would have only local importance.
Only certain segments of the three lines need be attacked to make the plan
effe~tive.5~
The JTG recommended that efforts by fighters to strafe locomotives and
water towers would be an added benefit because such attacks were easy to
make, were economical, and would force a heavy load on repair facilities. To
achieve military success and to meet the Fourteenth Air Force’s mission of
directly supporting the Chinese armies, Chennault’s staff had to choose the
specific segments carefully and closely coordinate the resultant attacks with the
ground forces. The JTG’ s studies also allowed Chennault to better manage the
always critical fuel supply by avoiding superfluous or uneconomical raids.55
The resulting fighter sweeps early in 1945 destroyed some 145 locomotives
plus a good number of bridges, railway lines, and rolling stock. Attacks on
nearby roads and canals prevented their use as alternate routes. When
intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese were taking damaged locomo-
tives to shops in north China, B-24s hit those shops and adjacent railyards in
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