Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Notes to Pages 288-300
83. Kenney Papers, Oct 28, Nov 10,11, nobu Tsuji, Singapore, the Japanese Ver-
1944.
84. SIB 5.69, NOV 27/28, 1944, SRHsion,
Margaret E. Lake, trans (Sidney,
1960), pp. 44-52.
203.
91. HQ South East Asia Command,
85. SIB 586, Dec 14/15, 1944, SRH- “SEA Translation and Interrogation Cen-
203.
tre Bulletins,” Nos. 76, 79, May 19, 25,
86. Craven and Cate, vol 5, MATTER- 1945, 820.605; SIB 317, Mar 19, 1944,
HORN to Nagasaki, 393-401; Kenney SRH-203; SRH-254, pp. 21,28A, 52.
Papers, Dec 20, 26, 1944; SIB 594, Dec 92. SRH-254, pp. 21, 28A, 52; Japa-
22/23,1944, SRH-203.
nese Signal Intelligence Service, 3d ed,
87. SIB 596, Dec 24/25, 1944, SRH- NOV 1, 1944, SRH-266, pp. 5-14; SIB
203; Kenney Papers, Jan 10, 1945; “Phil- 569, NOV 27/28, 1944, SRH-203.
ippine Sea Frontier, Air Intelligence 93. SIBs 277,279,292,296, all in Feb
Notes,” in Kenney Papers, Jan 1945. 1944, and SIB 569, Nov 27/28, 1944,
88. Kenney Papers, Jan 21, 1945; Cra- SRH-203. See also SRH-266, pp. 41-46,
ven and Cate, vol5, MATTERHORN to Na- and SRH-254, pp. 34-38.
gasaki, pp. 413-415.
94. SIBS 277,279,292,296, all in Feb
89. Alvin D. Coox, “Flawed Perception 1944, and SIB 569, Nov 27/28, 1944,
and Its Effect Upon Operational Thinking: SRH-203. See also SRH-266, pp. 41-46,
The Case of the Japanese Army, 1937- and SRH-254, pp. 34-38.
1941,” Intelligence and Military Opera- 95. SIBs 277,279,292,296, all in Feb
tions (London, 1990), pp. 239-254. See 1944, SRH-203; Kenney Papers, entries
also Michael Howard, Strategic Decep- for Jan 5, 1943, and succeeding days.
tion, vol 5 in F. H. Hinsley et al., British 96. SIBS 315, 327, Mar 17, 29, 1944,
Intelligence in the Second World War, SRH-203.
(London, 1990), pp. 203-221. Howard, in 97. SIBS 296,308,311, and 317, SRHdiscussing
deception efforts in the South 203.
East Asia Command, illustrates Japanese
intelligence flaws similar to those of the
Germans, resulting in an overestimation of
Allied strength. The overestimating came
about for similar reasons: an inadequately
developed military intelligence organization
unable to pursue hard-headed analytical
goals. See also The Japanese Intelligence
System, Sep 4, 1945, SRH-254.
90. Coox, “Flawed Perception”; Masa-
98. See Alvin D. Coox, “Japanese Military
Intelligence in the Pacific Theater: Its
Non-Revolutionary Nature,’’ and Takahashi
Hisashi, “A Case Study: Japanese
Intelligence Estimates of China and the
Chinese, 1931-1945,” The Intelligence
Revolution, Proceedings of the 13th Military
History Symposium, U.S. Air Force
Academy, October 1988 (Washington,
D.C., 1991), pp. 197-222.
1. Intvw, John F. Kreis with Lt Gen
Devol Brett, USAF, Ret, Feb 15, 1985;
Robert Lee Scott, Jr., The Day I Owned
the Sky (New York, Toronto, Sidney,
Aukland, 1988), pp. 74-75; Jack Samson,
Chennault (New York, 1987), pp. 89,91,
138,180; Kenney Papers, entry for Jan 18,
1943; Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell
452
CHAPTER 6
Papers, edited and arranged by Theodore
H. White (New York, 1948), pp. 35-38.
2. Kenney Reports, pp. 183, 240-241;
draft rprt, “The China Air Task Force,”
n.d. 862.057; intvw, with Capt John M.
Birch, Mar 20, 1945, 14th AF Hist Files,
862.01; ltr, Chennault to Bissell, subj:
Tables of Organization, Nov 15, 1942,