Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Planning the Defeat of Japan
all sources of intelligen~e,”~’ continued the note. On Guam, LeMay read
Arnold’s directive, but he doubted that the commanding general’s fears would
be translated into much of a threat. As a man respectful of Arnold’s position,
ability, and temperament, LeMay tried to calm Arnold’s apprehensions by
replying, “The [Japanese] now have little time for experimentation and
development of new aircraft types. Available production must be utilized to its
full capacity upon established models and replacement parts and engines.”
LeMay went on to note his belief, “All available air strength is currently being
used to counter, by large scale attacks against massed amphibious forces, an
expected invasion of the h~meland.”~~
LeMay correctly assessed the situation, but with the war’s end indefinite,
Arnold wanted no resurgence of Japanese defenses and tactical ability, not even
temporarily. The AAF’s commanding general was tired of the war, suffering
from heart problems, impatient to a degree rarely seen in other people, and
constantly concerned about his Air Force. As accurate as were the air intelligence
assessments of Japan’s remaining strength, Arnold knew that the reports
sent to him daily could be wrong or could have missed important details. By the
end of July, the Japanese government showed signs of surrender. T?e final
blows came early in August, delivered by the very-heavy bomber force over
which Arnold had worried and fussed for ~ears.5~
An early-July air intelligence analysis of Japan’s ability to continue the war
stated: “Japan’s war-making capability is not comparable in strength to that of
Germany [toward the end]. It [Japan] is already so weakened that imposition of
a high rate of combat expenditure would cause collapse.” Japan did not have
high combat losses, as she did not face conflict on her home temtory except for
the AAF-Navy air offensive. The intelligence analysts applying the lessons
brought home by some of the USSBS’s teams could not predict with any
accuracy either the course of combat Japan would follow or the time when the
war would end. Nor should they have tried to make such a prediction; that
would have violated one of the basic tenets of intelligence analysis and placed
them into a position of advocating a particular point of view. Such advocacy
could have easily guided them away from other, possibly more productive,
endeavors in impartially gathering and assessing information. Because of the
indeterminate nature of the Pacific conflict, Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada,
recently appointed ACIAS, Intelligence, played his hand conservatively,
holding the position that “Japanese war-making capability may retain
significant menace for a long time.” Quesada had no choice but to adopt that
view; he recognized that Japan’s leaders alone would have to decide how to
continue the fight against the Allies. The USSBS analysts who had returned
from Europe to help formulate the final assault on Japan now assumed much of
the role formerly held within the AAF by the COA?4
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