Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Taking the Offensive
destroyed, but photoreconnaissance noted a sharp diminution of river traffic.
The Allied authorities judged the effort so successful that similar flights
renewed the mines periodically.”
Elsewhere in Burma and Thailand, visual aerial reconnaissance and aerial
photography provided the bulk of information needed for mission planning
through 1943. Analysis of the Burmese transportation system (with which the
British were thoroughly familiar as the country’s colonial masters) revealed that
a handful of roads and railways carried most of the Japanese supplies from
Rangoon to the Burma front. Few alternatives existed to the limited network,
and the AAF made specific points of interest, such as bridges and railroad
tunnels, the object of frequent surveillance. From analysis and comparison of
operations and intelligence reports, the Allies noted that cutting the railroad’s
single main line north from Rangoon virtually stopped traffic for the time that
it took repairs to be made. Recognizing the opportunity to hamper Japanese
logistics efforts, the Allies decided on a campaign to destroy key railway repair
facilities, locomotives, and rolling stock. The effort capitalized initially on both
the isolation of the Burmese railway system from the systems of neighboring
countries and the few alternatives available to the Japanese. In March 1944, Col.
John R. Sutherland, the Tenth Air Force’s A-3, proposed an ambitious bombing
of bridges and long stretches of single-line track with well-spaced bombs
delivered from low level. Sutherland intended to use all of his P-51s, P-38s,
B-25s, and B-24s to cut the railway in at least 329 places along 41 1 miles of
track. Sutherland estimated that such an effort would require the Japanese to
move 312 tons of rails to make repairs. Simultaneously, attacks on railway
repair facilities and rolling stock would otherwise diminish the ability of the
railroad to function. Sutherland’s plan depended upon accurate and frequent
photoreconnaissance that the AAF supplied in ab~ndance.’~
The Tenth Air Force commander did not carry out Sutherland’s plan as
originally conceived-a single concerted effort with sustained follow-ups to
prevent the Japanese from reopening the vital supply link. The railroad,
however, became and remained through 1944 and 1945 a prime attack target for
the very reasons that first attracted Sutherland: its vulnerability due to its single-
track layout and a lack of alternate routes. The continued pursuit of the railroad
campaign did not mean that Allied operations in India and Burma were overly
harmonious. The differing goals of the British and the Americans in the region
created frequent problems that detracted from a united application of intelli-
gence in the air war.
For some time, the Allied war effort in India and Burma had suffered from
friction between the British, interested in defending India and recovering lost
territory, and the Americans, who had interests in China, the Philippines, and
elsewhere and who saw the local fighting as part of a greater Pacific war.
Almost as troublesome were overlapping military functions, intelligence among
them. To reduce the overlap and generally improve air efforts against the
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