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Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

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<strong>Piercing</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Fog</strong><br />

attack on <strong>the</strong> airfields in <strong>the</strong> vicinity, and it required substantial support from<br />

Halsey and Nimitz in <strong>the</strong> way of shipping and naval protection, much of which<br />

was directed by radio. Partly to cover MacArthur, Nimitz’s Central Pacific<br />

carrier task forces, supported by <strong>the</strong> Seventh and Thirteenth <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s, struck<br />

Japanese-held islands including Truk, Guam, Woleai, and Yap. Late in March,<br />

<strong>the</strong> Japanese reported by radio that <strong>the</strong>y had learned (probably again from <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

colonel captive) about American fighter and bomber tactics and of <strong>the</strong> functions<br />

of <strong>the</strong> radar analysis aircraft known as ferrets?’<br />

The full extent of Japan’s military intelligence capability and accomplishments<br />

remains obscured in <strong>the</strong> wreckage of her defeat and <strong>the</strong> large-scale<br />

destruction of records at <strong>the</strong> time of her surrender in 1945. Yet, <strong>the</strong> Japanese<br />

were not without an understanding of <strong>the</strong> AAF’s operations in <strong>the</strong> Pacific, and<br />

one should not assume <strong>the</strong>y were uncertain of Allied capability. Although less<br />

sophisticated than <strong>the</strong> Allied SIGINT system, Japan’s radio intercept teams<br />

accurately predicted and followed American attacks directed against <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

homeland. Hampered by <strong>the</strong> general lack of regard, even disdain, for intelligence<br />

as a field of military endeavor, some adroit Japanese analysts never<strong>the</strong>less<br />

reached surprising conclusions as to <strong>the</strong>ir enemy’s intentions. At least one<br />

such conclusion probably could not have been more correct had <strong>the</strong> Japanese<br />

had an ULTRA of <strong>the</strong>ir own equal to <strong>the</strong> SWPA’s CB. As <strong>the</strong> Allies drew up<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir plans for <strong>the</strong> projected November 1945 landing on Kyushu, Maj. Hori<br />

Eizo, who served on <strong>the</strong> Imperial Army’s General Staff and was an accepted<br />

expert on MacArthur’ s planning tendencies, predicted <strong>the</strong> landing beaches with<br />

uncanny, even unsettling, accuracy, based upon his thorough studies of past<br />

Allied campaigns. Working in smaller groups and with fewer resources than<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir Allied counterparts, Japanese air intelligence officers kept a close watch<br />

on AAF combat operations, all <strong>the</strong> while <strong>the</strong> Allies’ ULTRA system was<br />

allowing Kenney’s senior staff to watch over <strong>the</strong> shoulders of <strong>the</strong> Japanese<br />

analysts at work.’8

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