Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
little damage on the refinery, but all of the mines fell into the river channel. The
XX Bomber Command directed subsequent missions at iron and steel plants at
Anshan, Manchuria. Operations from China were few, as logistics problems and
the difficulty of using the new, not fully developed B-29 greatly restricted
flying. Frequent poor weather over the targets further hindered the overtaxed
operations. Weather information had always been an important element in
intelligence planning. Now it assumed an even greater role, yet there was no
way to accurately forecast weather en route to or over a target so far away.
The problems were not unanticipated, and the XX Bomber Command's
intelligence officers sought to alleviate some over which they had a measure of
control. Chinese and Allied observation stations gathered and reported current
weather data in an attempt to understand the Japanese cloud cover and winds
they would encounter." Much of the spring of 1944 saw the target section of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence of the XX Bomber Command preparing
and assembling route and target materials, both radar and visual. By May 18,
the individual bomb groups knew of steel and aluminum targets in Manchuria;
they even had stereoscopic photographs. Four days later, the flyers had a
preliminary estimate of the state of Japan's petroleum production. The
operational intelligence section of the A-2 office prepared information on
Japanese fighter tactics and combined that data with the enemy air OB in the
areas of China and Japan over which the B-29s would fly. The staff reviewed
or prepared air and ground rescue plans and issued training materials and
equipment to aid crew members in escape and evasion should their aircraft be
shot or forced down. The information was to stand many of the crews in good
stead in the coming months.
In August 1944, aXX Bomber Command staff reorganization abolished the
position of Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, substituting a tri-deputy organization.
Part of the reason this change was possible was the heavy involvement of the
Air Staff A-2 in Washington, who did much of the target analysis work for the
Twentieth Air Force. Intelligence in the XX Bomber Command became a
section reduced in size under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. Col. James
D. Garcia became its chief. Some of the duties previously managed by A-2,
such as search and rescue, moved to other staff agencies. To accommodate the
smaller intelligence office, the commander discontinued various reports. During
busy periods, outside personnel not fully employed elsewhere (and not
necessarily qualified in intelligence work) were pressed into service." In spite
of the growing influence of Washington, a number of things simply could not
be done outside of India and China.
The AAF and the Navy had since 1942 slowly expanded and improved
their electronic warfare capabilities. Often the two services had worked
together, reaping joint benefits. One result was that the B-29s came from the
factory ready to incorporate a wide variety of radar and RCM equipment. On
June 29, 1944, B-29s equipped with radar-detection and warning sets began
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