Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Retrospection
air power on Okinawa to support Operation OLYMPIC, MacArthur’s great
invasion of the home islands, scheduled for November 1,1945. By then Kenney
controlled not only Fifth Air Force, but also Thirteenth from the South Pacific
and Seventh from the Central Pacific. Such was the high regard with which he
was held.
Contrasting the Allied success at intelligence exploitation in the Pacific, the
problems in the CBI Theater reflected three distinct difficulties. First, British
and American war aims were so divergent as to make military cooperation
difficult. The common need to defeat the enemy meant that, at lower levels,
useful cooperation occurred. This cooperation was partially due to a growing
awareness of the need for more combined air intelligence centers, much like
those found in Europe. Second, the organization of the theater left much to be
desired (the organization can only be described as being inversely proportional
to the size of the forces being led and to their military effectiveness, at least in
the early days of the fighting). Finally, one can only note a general lack of
geniality and level of trust among senior commanders--Chiang, Stilwell,
Wavell, Chennault, and Bissell-that made relationships in the Allied high
command in the European theater appear to be problem-free.
Within the CBI Theater, intelligence was critical. In particular, the nature
of the terrain in Burma and India made HUMINT particularly important. The
clandestine organizations established in this area by the American OSS and the
British Special Operations Executive proved crucial in passing useful
intelligence to airmen. Allied intelligence officers did an effective job in
analyzing the geography of the theater. The mining of the Rangoon estuary on
the basis of an analysis of Burmese landforms and railways is an excellent case
of how an intelligence organization can spot weaknesses in the enemy’s
situation merely by thinking through the problem and using information readily
at hand. As with other theaters of war, all sources of intelligence proved
enormously helpful to air operations; signals intelligence was as useful as it was
in other areas. Photoreconnaissance was invaluable in both target selection and
damage assessment.
In China an enormous philosophical difference existed between Stilwell and
the indigenous political and military leadership (Chiang and his nationalist
regime), the latter being supported by one of Stilwell’s subordinates, Claire
Chennault. Stilwell regarded the creation of a well-trained and disciplined
ground force as sine qua non for effective military operations against the
Japanese in the theater, but that demanded substantive reform of the Chinese
nationalist regime, something that Chiang either would not allow or could not
accomplish. In effect, Chennault offered a shortcut for the military and strategic
defeat of the Japanese, one that would allow Chiang to husband his strength for
the coming struggle against the communists. That shortcut involved the
supposed use of air power to redress the deficiencies of Chinese ground forces.
Chennault believed that his air units could beat the Japanese first in China with
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