Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
execute their missions effectively. Because they were now beyond the regions
covered extensively before June, the IX TAC reconnaissance section’s primary
task became the preparation of photomosaics, maps, and annotated target photos
for the target section. In addition, this section evaluated bomb damage,
analyzed, in cooperation with A-3, the effects of special bombing techniques,
and prepared, in conjunction with the target section, target dossiers and mission
folders.204
Unless 12th Army Group or Ninth Air Force directed a specific operation
or the reallocation of forces from one tactical air command to another, the army
and tactical air commanders and their key staff officers made the daily target
decision^.^" Major Buck’s list served as the basic compilation for selecting
targets. As with other such lists, the source of any specific bit of information
was often difficult to ascertain. In his postwar report, Buck admitted that while
ULTRA provided “the basic and most reliable material,” he blended this with
other sources before he forwarded his recommendations to Ninth Air Force and
the tactical air commands.% SHAEF G-2 also published periodic revisions to
a master interdiction handbook, which identified bridges and viaducts by
location, indicated their structural characteristics, previous damage, and flak
defenses, and included other appropriate assessments.m Not surprisingly,
because the overwhelming portion of targets involved the German Amy, most
of the ULTRA intelligence came through army channels and was presented by
the army SSO assigned to the appropriate headquarters.
While photoreconnaissance and other sources focused on static locations,
ULTRA provided glimpses of more fleeting targets. In one of its most spectacular
offerings, ULTRA revealed the location of the German headquarters
responsible for controlling all panzer divisions sent against the Allies in the
opening days of NEPTUNE. Based on this intelligence, an especially effective air
strike caused such damage and casualties as to remove that critical command
center for two weeks.”’ Similarly, a decrypt pinpointing a concentration of
military vehicles camouflaged in a wooded area in eastern France two months
later was passed to the XIX TAC A-2. After the original source was protected
by an air reconnaissance mission, the subsequent air attack destroyed an
estimated 400 vehicles.2w
Among the most significant insights ULTRA offered were the locations of
fuel and ammunition dumps. These installations, often difficult to detect from
the air, provided the lifeblood of the German forces. Even here, mission
planners still needed photographs to pinpoint precise locations since decrypts
generally identified only an area. For example, a series of messages in late
August 1944 referred to a fuel depot at Givet, France, without providing an
exact location in the village or surrounding area.’” ULTRA could be more
precise on occasion. On August 26, BP signaled the decrypt of a request for a
locomotive and tank cars to move oil from Pont sec de Passy, near Lezinnes,
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