Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Retrospection
From the first, Kenney displayed a keen sense of how intelligence could be
used. He was not well served by MacArthur’s staff because special intelligence
from Honolulu and Washington unfortunately was funneled into the SWPA
through General Sutherland. Sutherland in turn passed what he thought was
significant to MacArthur directly, often leaving the intelligence organizations,
including MacArthur’s chief of intelligence, in the dark. Kenney and the air
effort were hurt less than might have otherwise occurred. He inherited an air
intelligence organization originally created to meet the needs of Field Marshal
Wavell’s combined command. Kenney was integrated into the extensive British
and Australian net which read low-grade Japanese codes and ciphers in the
theater, made radio traffic analyses, and gathered intelligence from the effective
and efficient coast-watching effort established before the war by the Australians.
Kenney’s personality, abrasive at times but certainly not imperial,
matched Australian sensibilities far better than was true with either MacArthur
or most of his staff.
In time, Hewitt, Kenney’s intelligence chief, and the SWPA headquarters
became responsible for the long-range intelligence planning, while Fifth Air
Force’s (and eventually Thirteenth Air Force’s) intelligence organizations were
responsible for the day-to-day operational and tactical intelligence. Throughout
the war, Kenney proved himself a commander who consistently and coherently
used intelligence to accomplish his mission. Whether it be the reports of coast
watchers or the deciphering of high-level messages, he incorporated intelligence
to its best advantage to attack Japanese weaknesses, to avoid their strengths, or
to deceive the enemy as to his own intentions. The classic example of Kenney’s
skillful utilization of past and present intelligence undoubtedly came in the
Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Past intelligence indicated how the Japanese would
probably move a major reinforcing effort, and ULTRA indicated when that move
would begin. In combination, Kenney and his subordinates constructed a
realistic and effective campaign plan that allowed them to smash the Japanese.
This skillful use of intelligence, combined with extraordinary flexibility and
adaptability to the actual conditions of war, probably made Kenney’s employment
of air power the most effective, given the resources employed, of all
Allied air power in World War 11.
Kenney’s first contributions were strikes at Rabaul in 1942 in support of the
landings at Guadalcanal; special intelligence almost immediately confirmed for
him and MacArthur that the ability of the Japanese to use the airfields at Rabaul
had been upset if not reduced. In September 1942, Kenney had flown an
infantry regiment into Port Moresby to help defend southern New Guinea, an
action that was not exactly in line with the accepted, narrowly defined view of
air power held by many within the Army. The interdiction of the Japanese sea
lines of communication from Rabaul to New Guinea during the following year
showed the talents of Kenney and his very able subordinate, Ennis Whitehead,
to their greatest advantage. In that case, the patient collection, collation, and
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