Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
McCormack. They remained MIS representatives under the command of
Colonel Taylor and were attached rather than permanently assigned to
operational headq~arters.2~
In March 1944, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff personally delineated the
responsibilities of these officers, whose ranks ranged from lieutenants to
lieutenant colonels. In a letter to General Eisenhower, the senior American
officer in Europe, General Marshall wrote of the SSOs, “Their primary
responsibilities will be to evaluate ULTRA intelligence, present it in useable
form to the commanding officer and to such of his senior staff officers as are
authorized ULTRA recipients, assist in fusing ULTRA intelligence with
intelligence derived from other sources, and give advice in connection with
making operational use of ULTRA intelligence in such fashion that the security
of the source is not endangered.”24 This was a heavy burden. In the words of one
junior officer, it was a great compliment that his commanding general entrusted
him to evaluate signals rather than reading them himself, but it was also one that
“produced gray hairs.”25
The SSOs were not the only individuals indoctrinated into or authorized to
handle ULTRA. By the fall of 1944, in fact, the number of indoctrinated officers
had expanded well beyond commanders and senior staff officers. General
Spaatz’s personal intelligence officer at HQ USSTAF (Adv.) handled ULTRA
along with other intelligence sources. At least four USSTAF officers on duty in
the Air Ministry had access to ULTRA.^^ By the end of the war, some twentyfive
to thirty officers in HQ Eighth Air Force were cleared to receive ULTRA.”
The circle of indoctrinated individuals remained quite small. At HQ Ninth
Air Force, it included only the commanding general, the director of intelligence,
and a few others, including the director of operations, but none of his subordinates.28
In the Southwest Pacific, the Fifth Air Force director of operations was
not cleared for ULTRA until late in 1944, and his deputy Lt. Col. Francis C.
Gideon knew only that Capt. Phil Graham, who was serving as the SSO, “was
in that kind [special intelligence] of business.”*” The Chief of Staff of XIX
Tactical Air Command (TAC), which supported Third Army in Europe, was not
cleared for ULTRA until October 1944, more than four months after D-da~.~’
Regardless of the scope of his clientele, it remained the SSO’s responsibility
to shepherd ULTRA, ensure its secure handling, and prevent operational
decisions that might jeopardize its continuance. The delicate situations in which
this placed junior officers somewhat explains their special status outside the
normal headquarters command structure. Their position allowed them greater
freedom to remind senior officers of the restrictions on the handling, discussion,
*Gideon, later the Fifth’s deputy for operations and subsequently a lieutenant
general, also noted he could not “recall a single instance when Phil Graham’s
information was particularly valuable to me.” Intvw, Dr. Robert C. Ehrhart with Lt
Gen Francis Gideon, May 18, 1988, p. 22.
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