Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Retrospection
the previous year, replied that such a fighter could never hold its own against
short-range day fighters. A chastened Churchill responded that such a view
closed “many American airmen were no more prescient with their
intelligence analyses; their reading of loss rates in 1942 suggested that escort
fighters were unnecessary. Eighth Air Force attitudes were summed up by a
letter that Eaker sent Spaatz in October 1942:
The second phase, which we are about to enter, is the demonstration that
day bombing can be economically executed using general fighter support.
. . in getting through the German defensive fighter belt and to help our
cripples home through this same belt; the third phase will include deeper
penetrations into enemy territory, using long-range fighter accompaniment
of the P-38 type in general support only and continuing the use of short-
range fighters at critical points on a time schedule; the fourth phase will
be a demonstration that bombardment in force-a minimum of 300
bombers--can effectively attack any German target and return without
excessive and uneconomical losses. This later phase relies upon mass and
the great firepower of the large bombardment formations?6
Eaker’ s letter is remarkable for more than his assumption that great formations
of B-17s could defend themselves without protection by escort fighters. It is
clear from his letter that, as with the Lu&u$fe’s intelligence before the Battle
of Britain, he assumed enemy defensive forces would array themselves in a
narrow and rather well-defined belt, downplaying the German option of a
defense in depth.
Luckily for the Americans, their theories were not tested at the end of 1942
and the first half of 1943. Because of Operation TORCH (the landings of Anglo-
American forces in Morocco and Algeria) a substantial portion of American air
assets was shifted to the Mediterranean, site of one of the crucial air battles of
World War 11. The impact of the TORCH diversion on American air operations
onto the continent was suostantial. Between November 1942 and March 1943
Eighth Air Force could launch only two raids of more than 100 bombers, a force
by Eaker’s own calculation incapable of fighting its way into and back out of
the Reich.*’ The shift to the Mediterranean in retrospect was wholly beneficial
for American ground and air forces. Leading American airmen and their
intelligence officers had to address the problems of air power in joint tactical
operations. The doctrine of precision bombing attacks against highly specialized
segments of the German economy had little relevance in a theater where those
targets were out of range, where the crucial problem from the first involved the
winning of air superiority, and where the major mission of Allied air forces after
gaining air superiority was to cut the sea lanes of communication supporting
Axis forces in North Africa. In Northwest Africa, joint service cooperation was
a must, and not surprisingly the leading air and ground commanders emerged
to command the landing on the European continent in the next year.
Intelligence was crucial to Allied success in the Mediterranean. Here a
close cooperation quickly evolved between British and American intelligence
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