Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Notes to Pages 205-220
AFs, Jan 11, 1944, LC, Spaatz Collection,
box 143.
107. Combined Ops Planning Commit-
tee, “Tactical Plan for the Air Battle of
Leipzig . . . ,” Nov 29, 1943, LC, Spaatz
Collection, box 147.
108. HQ VIII Bom Comd A-2, “ARGU-
MENT Target Suggestions,” NOV 23,1943,
520.4231B.
109. Special Intel Rprt [No. 631, HQ
NAAF A-2, “Strategic Targets,’’ Dec 24,
1943, 617.608.
1 10. Craven and Cate, vol3, ARGUMENT
to V-E Day, pp. 33-44.
11 1. Memo, Capt J. C. Reed to Col
McDonald, Feb 26, 1944, LC, Spaatz
Collection, box 143.
112. Teletype Conf Script, Feb 27,
1944, LC, Spaatz Collection, box 67.
11 3. “Use of Strategic Air Power After
1 March 1944,” Feb 28, 1944, in War
Diary, pp. 70ff.
114. Craven and Cate, vol3, ARGUMENT
to V-E Day, p. 45.
115. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, vol3, pt 1, p. 317.
116. Haines Report, p. 82.
117. Ibid., p. 83.
118. Ibid., p. 92.
119. Ibid., p. 86.
120. Ibid., p. 92.
121. Ibid., p. 91.
122. Carl Boyd, “Significance of
MAGIC and the Japanese Ambassador to
Berlin: (1) The Formative Months Before
Pearl Harbor,” Intelligence and National
Security, Jan 1987, pp. 150-1 5 1.
123. Memo, Maj Gen F. L. Anderson,
Feb 12., 1944, LC, Spaatz Collection, box
61. 124. Rprt, Capt Harold J. Bamett, “The
Use of Strategic Air Power after 1 March
1944,” pp. 70ff.
125. Ibid.
126. HQ USSTAF, “Plan for Comple-
tion of the Combined Bomber Offensive,”
Mar 5, 1944, LC, Spaatz Collection, box
61. 127. “Petroleum Industry,” n.d., atched
to Ltr, Capt Kindleberger to Col Hughes,
subj: M.E.W. Comment on USSTAF Plan
for Attack Against Oil Installations, Mar
25,1944, LC, Spaatz Collection, box 144.
444
128. Ltr, Kindleberger to Hughes, Mar
25, 1944.
129. Dir Bom Ops, “Notes on the Em-
ployment of the Strategic Bomber Forces
Prior to ‘OVERLORD,”’ Mar 19,1944, LC,
Spaatz Collection, box 144.
130. COA, “Requested Comment on
JIC 106/2,” Jan 12, 1944, and “Report on
German Aviation Gasoline Position,” Jan
18, 1944, both in LC, Spaatz Collection,
box 67.
13 1. Ltr, Spaatz to Eisenhower, Mar 5,
1944, LC, Spaatz Collection, box 144.
132. HQ USSTAF, “Plan for the Completion
of the Combined Bomber Offensive.”
133. See, e.g., Memo, Capt Kindleberger
to Col Hughes, subj: Summary Account
of Meeting of 25 February 1944, Norfolk
House, Feb 26, 1944, LC, Spaatz Collection,
box 144, and Memos, Lt R. H. DOK,
USNR, OSS, to Col W. F. Chapmen, A-3,
MAAF (Adv.), subj: Comments on Air
Attack on Marshalling Yards, Feb 8,1944,
and subj: The Value of Marshalling Yards
as Targets: Mediterranean Example, Feb
22, 1944, both cited in EOU, “War Diary,”
pp. 86-90.
134. AD Ops (SO), “The Battle of the
Flying Bomb,” n.d., pp. 1-2, and D of I
(0), “CROSS-BOW: Summary of Information,”
Jun 12, 1943, both in LC, Spaatz
Collection, box 171; Ltr, Hughes to CG,
8th AF, Aug 1 1, 1943, LC, Spaatz Collection,
box 171; Powys-Lybbe, Eye oflntelligence,
pp. 90-91, 188, 191; Hinsley,
British Intelligence in the Second World
War, vol 3, pt 1, pp. 371, 363-364, 390-
393.
135. “Battle of the Flying Bomb.”
136. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, vol3, pt 1, p. 385.
137. Ibid., p. 399n.
138. “U.S. Army Air Forces Activities
in United Kingdom Covering Period from
February 20, 1942, to December 31,
1943,” LC, Spaatz Collection, box 20.
139. Minutes, mtg to discuss attack of
installations in northern France, Aug 11,
1943,519.4311.1.
140. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, vol3, pt 1, p. 399n.
141. “Battle of the Flying Bomb,” p. 2;