Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
campaign, the Allies created a Joint Oil Targets Committee in July. In early
August, General McDonald forwarded to the USSTAF deputy for operations the
first comprehensive assessment of this group. Assuming a base level of 100
percent production in April 1944, the oil targets committee estimated this had
been cut to 80 percent in May, to 58 percent in June (revised to 50 percent the
next month), and to 49.5 percent in July (with an anticipated downward revision
as more complete data became available). The committee also suggested that
failure to continue operations at the same level would enable the enemy’s
production to rise as high as 68.5 percent by the end of August.U3
Given the difficulties of assessing physical damage, let alone the impact of
any given strike on production, the precision with which analysts rendered their
estimates was questionable. Just two months earlier, in a message prepared by
his director of intelligence, Spaatz had admitted to General Arnold his
continuing difficulties in evaluating the damage being done to production
capacities, in assessing the impact on the enemy’s combat capabilities, and in
estimating repair times. Moreover, he pointed out, such analysis was never
instantaneous because weather often delayed poststrike reconnaissance
missions. Referring specifically to the oil attacks in May, he observed the
targets struck on May 12 had not been photographed until twelve days later.234
Postwar analysis would reveal that the Allies’ estimates of German oil
production, consumption, and reserves were all too high, although the various
errors tended to cancel out one another.235 While the statistics were not always
correct, the general trend was clear enough. More to the point, Allied intelligence
was now beginning to obtain authoritative evidence of the operational
impact of the oil campaign.
While indications of the effectiveness of these operations came through a
variety of channels, Enigma was by far the dominant source. As early as June
5, 1944, the GAF operations staff advised subordinate units that because of
“encroachment into the production of a/c fuel by enemy action . . . it has been
necessary to break into the strategic reserves.”236 While this reserve was larger
and the actual consumption of oil less than the Allies had estimated, such a step
was seen as indicative of the potential the oil campaign offered. A month later,
Reichsmarshall Herman Goering, decreed, “Drastic economy [in fuel use] is
absolutely That samemonth, becauseof fuel shortages and directly
contradicting previously standard procedures, the Germans ordered aircraft not
to fly away from bases where attacks were expected.238 Nor were combat units
engaged against Allied forces in France exempt. In midJuly Luftflotte 3
announced its intention to remove fuel stored at inactive bases, a measure that
would severely restrict operational fle~ibility.’~’ A month later, that same
headquarters announced, “Damage to fuel production demands a further
considerably greater reduction of all flying activities . . . [only] fighter
operations in the course of air defense remain ~nrestricted.”~
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