Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Planning the Defeat of Japan
Knowledge of ULTRA was not a panacea by any means. The A-2 knew, but
could not tell his staff, who continued to labor at projects that brought them into
contact and conflict with those in the G-2 office who had broader knowledge
of many aspects of air intelligence. At the same time, and mitigating some of
the problems, improvements in the systematic handling and preparation of
intelligence information sped the delivery of analytical products to the AAF’ s
field commanders.
Organization and Interservice Relationships
The Air Staff reorganization of March 29, 1943, greatly broadened the A-2
office’s scope of affairs, giving the air staff‘s intelligence operation new stature
and opening avenues for expanded work. The combat liaison branch of the
Operational Intelligence Division became a separate division teamed with
training coordination. The former Administrative Division disappeared and a
new Historical Division came into being. The latter division represented AAF
headquarters’ method of meeting President Roosevelt’s and General Arnold’s
directions to record the operations and activities of the war, something that had
not been done in the conflict in Europe until after the 1917-1918 American
involvement there. Where the reform of the War Department in March 1942 had
created equal AAF, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces, these
changes one year later resolved some of the nagging problems that various air
staff offices believed impeded their ability to function effecti~e1y.I~
The AAF Intelligence Service (AFIS), the operating agency working under
the A-2 since 1942, lost its separate identity. From March 1942, the AFIS and
the A-2 had some overlapping functions; in the spring of 1943, Arnold
combined those AFIS activities most directly related to staff intelligence with
the A-2. Some other tasks went elsewhere. For example, the supervision of
policies related to the safeguarding of military information and the processing
of security clearances for training shifted to the Air Provost Marshal’s office.
With few other changes, the March 1943 reorganization shaped the A-2 office’s
form and function for the remainder of the war years. Unlike the 1943
reorganization, lesser changes of 1944 and 1945 within the A-2 office related
to the need to change focus periodically to provide data to the operating
commands, primarily the Twentieth Air Force, engaged in the strategic
campaign in the Pacific war.I4 The A-2 was the Twentieth Air Force’s A-2 as
well, and much of the Air Staff‘s intelligence work was related to the B-29
operation. The chart on the facing page shows the A-2 office’s functions after
the 1943 reorganization.
Through 1943, many senior officers working in military and naval
intelligence in Washington saw the duplication of work by several agencies.
The overlap was especially evident in the relations between the WDGS’s
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