Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The Pacific and Far East
a suitable base in northern Australia and to offer it as an operating site until
better locations could be had. Kenney wanted to get hold of the superbombers
and put them to use in his theater, and he saw oil as the best target to promote
the idea. In Washington, Arnold had refused the request, fearing that once a
theater commander controlled the new bombers he would not release them. That
would be the end of the strategic bombing command just then beginning
operations, and perhaps the end of an independent postwar air force as well.’5
Failing to get B-29s, Kenney decided to use his own B-24s flying from
newly captured Sansapor Island, off the northern shore of the westernmost part
of New Guinea. The first two of these raids on Balikpapan-n September 30
and October 3,1944-badly damaged refining plants and storage capacity, but
they encountered heavier than expected aerial opposition. The Japanese were
not as impotent in the area as Kenney had thought. Reliance on the absence of
radio intercepts as an indicator of lack of opposition had misled Kenney into a
belief that the project would be easier than it was. Intercepted messages on
October 5 revealed that the Japanese Naval Air Force’s 381 Group had gone so
far as to establish an airborne fighter patrol on the approaches to the refinery,
with links to outlying radar stations. On October 8, ULTRA revealed the
presence of the 341 Group near Balikpapan as well. Not wishing to risk
bombers and crews unnecessarily, Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force B-24 group
commanders altered flight formations to tighten the assembly of aircraft and
give greater mutual protection for the October 10th and 14th attacks.* Longrange
P-38s andP-47~ hastily moved to forward airdromes and flew as escorts.
Despite intense aerial combat, the bombers inflicted additional severe damage
on Balikpapan’s refinery and storage areas. Overall, the raids cost twenty-two
B-24s and nine accompanying fighters, a stiff price for the SWPA but light in
terms of some loss rates in Europe. The attacks proved their worth, crippling
production at the Borneo facility and setting the stage for the assault on the
phi lip pine^.^^
Shortly after Nimitz’s forces captured Guam and Saipan and had moved on to
bombarding Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands, MacArthur was ready to land in
the Philippines. Promoted by intelligence indicating Japanese weakness on
Leyte and by the interplay between the major Allied commands in the Pacific,
the landing came a month earlier than first planned-n October 20, 1944. In
mid-September, Admiral Halsey’s men, in rescuing a pilot shot down over
Leyte, heard from natives that no Japanese were on the island. On the basis of
this and other information, Halsey suggested to Nimitz that they forego landings
on Yap and Ulithi and move instead to Leyte. Nimitz deferred to MacArthur,
*In support of the raid, air-sea rescue including submarines and Catalina flying
boats kept station well inside Japanese-held territory to recover downed airmen.
Those craft rescued most of the crewmen shot down on the two final attacks.
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