Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
The Allied landing at Hollandia followed soon after the capture of Manus,
occumng on April 22, 1944. For this operation, Kenney’s AAF staff planned
much differently. Hollandia, as a result of recent Japanese retreats westward,
had become the major forward Japanese Army Air Force base facing MacAr-
thur’s men. Although the object of repeated aerial attacks early in 1944, the
enemy’s base remained a substantial threat. Allied intelligence assessed its
ground defense strength at about 8,654 general troops and 7,650 airmen, of
which the analysts described 2,250 as air duty personnel. As of April 7, Allied
commanders believed that Japan’s Eighteenth Army headquarters was moving
to Hollandia from Wewak. The Japanese base operation structure at Wewak
appeared rather resilient, retaining the ability to quickly repair some forms of
damage to the dirt-surfaced landing areas. A B-24 strike the morning of March
31 had left two of three runways unusable, but all returned to service by that
afternoon. To buttress their air capability, the Japanese could draw from
airfields at Sarmi and Wakde, the four airdromes near Wewak, the airdrome at
Tadji, and the one in the Vogelkop area. SIGINT also indicated that the
Japanese were surveying other airfield sites in western New Guinea as
Kenney and Whitehead focused their concern not so much on Hollandia
itself, which they believed they could control via air attack, but rather on the
base and air support structure to the rear that the Japanese seemed to be
strengthening. Kenney womed about Japanese efforts to improve their combat
aircraft and the rate at which they could assemble reinforcements from the NEI,
the Philippines, and the home islands, and direct them against the Allies.
Knowledge of the rather weak strength of the ground garrison at Hollandia and
the tactical dispositions that would necessarily disperse that strength when
fighting began promised victory for the Army. Signals intercepts indicated, but
did not confirm, a possible shortage of aviation gasoline on the Davao-Galela-
Ambon-Hollandia route. Such a shortage, the product of Allied air and naval
antishipping efforts, also promised to delay air reinforcement in western New
Guinea. Unfortunately, the reported shortage could not be confirmed. Experi-
ence had shown, however, that the enemy could marshal considerable air power
when necessary.
On March 8, Whitehead advised Kenney that the Japanese were keeping
about 100 fighters at Hollandia and he reminded his commander that the
previous October replacements had come to Rabaul at about 200 per week. At
that rate, Whitehead’s 150 P-38s had been worn down during the space of about
three weeks. For the projected Hollandia campaign, Whitehead calculated that
just 50 new fighters a week would be very dangerous because he had only 32
long-range P-38s and 177 operational B-24s available. To find the most recent
information on Japanese air capability, Kenney asked his A-2, Colonel Cain,
to make a special air OB study. The study took some preparation, and, in the
meantime, Admiral Nimitz, meeting with MacArthur in Brisbane on March 27,
expressed grave fears of a possible Japanese air force reaction to the Hollandia
280