Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Tools of Air Intelligence
At the tactical air command level, ULTRA did offer frequent inputs for
mission planning. This proved especially valuable because higher headquarters
generally provided only broad guidance, while leaving the TACs to determine,
plan, and execute their own missions in conjunction with the appropriate Army
headquarters. Some of this intelligence pertained to the GAF. Enigma messages
enabled Allied night fighters to conduct very effective intercepts against
German transports attempting to resupply the beleaguered fortresses along the
Atlantic coast in the summer of 1944.’6 ULTRA provided extensive intelligence
on the primary target of tactical air forces-the German Army. This information
ranged from the specific-the location of enemy units, fuel and supply depots,
and movements-to more general insights into losses and shortages of
equipment and manpower. Close coordination between army and tactical air
command staffs frequently allowed such intelligence to provide the basis for air
interdiction missions.
In contrast to strategic air operations, ULTRA provided the tactical forces
with greater assistance in target selection than in damage assessment. For XI1
TAC in Italy the SSO reported, “The occasional damage reports on specific
targets are of doubtful value because [XII] TAC attacks vast numbers of small
targets every day.”” According to one postwar report on ULTRA’S use, in
general there was “a scarcity of immediate intelligence” on fighter-bomber
damage in western Europe.’8 The SSO at Ninth Air Force noted that photoreconnaissance
and interpretation were generally more useful in damage assessment
than was ULTRA. The same individual added, however, that ULTRA’S damage
assessment contribution was particularly important in the winter of 1944 when
weather often prevented effective aerial reconnaissance.w
ULTRA’S overriding contribution for both tactical and strategic air
operations was the guidance it provided in evaluating other sources, in
interpreting otherwise unclear information, and in directing more effective
employment of other intelligence capabilities and resources. Certainly the SSOs
who were responsible for ULTRA and for blending it with other sources of
intelligence clearly viewed this as its primary contribution: “The greatest value
which the special intelligence officer can be to the headquarters which he is
serving is to be constantly developing and exploiting in a legitimate manner
[i.e., with proper cover] the general intelligence which he knows has been
confirmed by source. . . [and] in guiding the employment of other intelligence
sources in order to build up the general intelligence picture. . . .’’loo In short,
ULTRA substantiated intelligence from other sources. It also suggested where
to look and for what to search in other sources. Lt. Col. James Fellers expressed
the objective toward which all SSOs strove in this regard: “The ultimate aim of
every intelligence section is to build the ordinary intelligence picture up to the
level of the very special intelligence picture.”’” At Fifteenth Air Force, for
example, the ULTRA SSO contributed his “superior wisdom” to the interpretation
of aerial photographs for the targets branch.”* According to the Y
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