Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
fighters.” Two weeks later, the report gave a description of the He 177,
including photos and data on wing configuration and loading, armament, fuel
capacity, and speed. The Me 323 transport, which would become a primary
target in the later stages of the campaign, was introduced in a weekly report on
February 23 as “really a glider with engines.” Equally valuable was the
information on trends in enemy tactics. As early as December 5, 1942, the
Weekly Intelligence Summary for Twelfth Air Force warned that enemy fighters
in France were reported to be engaging B-17s in frontal attacks. Later NAAF
reports included comments from Lufiaffe POWs on tactics debates within
German fighter
In contrast to the inefficiencies found at A-2, NAAF, Colonel Barr judged
intelligence at NASAF to be “very thoroughly organized, [and] in close touch
with subordinate groups. . . .” While administrative and reporting duties were
not neglected, they were not allowed to interfere with “the essential and primary
duty” of providing Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle, his staff, and his group
commanders “up-to-date evaluated information on the disposition, defenses,
tactics, and targets of the enemy.””’ (Doolittle’s appreciation of intelligence
would be further reflected in 1944 when he would insist on having an ULTRA
representative assigned to Eighth Air Force.)
The period from January 1943 until the final surrender of Axis forces in
North Africa reflected the versatility and flexibility of air power. Within the
broad objectives assigned by higher headquarters, Spaatz and his subordinate
commanders switched their focus to meet the changing theater situation by
striking airfields and ports in Tunisia, ships at sea, and ports and airfields in
Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy. Weather, force size, developments in the ground war,
and logistics all influenced the expanding air activity, but essential to its success
was timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence. To obtain this intelli-
gence, air commanders called upon a wide range of capabilities that included
photoreconnaissance, agent reports, POW interrogations, aircrew reports, radio
intercepts, and ULTRA.
Combat experience quickly revealed that the command’s basic need in
planning and operations was regular aerial photography of proposed targets.
Urged on by Spaatz and Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham, commander of
NATAF, General Eisenhower pleaded with the British Chiefs in January 1943
for additional photoreconnaissance capability, asserting that high-performance
reconnaissance was “absolutely essential” in the effort to reduce enemy lines of
communication into At an air commanders’ conference two months
later, Spaatz stressed that regular reconnaissance over the Sicilian straits and the
Tyrrhenian Sea was key to an effective antishipping campaign, whereby the
Allies would deny supplies and reinforcements to Axis forces in North Africa.
Noting that photoreconnaissance missions were already being flown over the
Italian port cities of Genoa, Leghorn, Taranto, Bari, and Naples, Doolittle said
he was prepared to launch heavy bombers within six hours when photographs
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