Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
at sea increased. Until this last condition was met, the effort to strike either
construction yards or bases “will be quite disproportionate to the results.”’46
In response to a request from Arnold for an assessment of all aspects of
antisubmarine operations by air, in January 1943 Eighth Air Force’s A-5
produced the most extensive analysis to date. The report recommended against
attacks on component parts factories (because of locations and redundancies)
and construction yards (because of the lag in operational impact). Although
complete destruction was not possible, planners concluded that the five
operating bases “appear to be by far the most profitable targets.” By seriously
crippling “vulnerable points. . . continuous and frequent attacks on these bases”
could keep them “dislocated and greatly increase the turn-around time of the U-
boats,” which would decrease the number of boats operating at any given
time. 147
The report then analyzed the potential value of attacking submarines
transiting the Bay of Biscay and the demonstrated value of defensive and
offensive air patrols in support of convoys. It would be impossible, the planners
concluded, to destroy the U-boat threat in the next twelve months regardless of
the method of air operations. Therefore, the problem was one of keeping losses
to an acceptable level. “The problem . . . becomes one of control.” For this,
primary emphasis should be on “convoy air protection, supplemented by air
attacks on submarines in transit and regular air attacks on the operating bases.”
Sorties of 50 bombers per week against each operating base, a total weekly
144
Col. Harris B. Hull