Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
time, the U.S.S. Punuy had been loaded with remnants of Japanese equipment
when the Japanese sank her in the Yangtze River. The emphasis of Air Materiel
Command’s Technical Data Laboratory on testing and improving American
designs provided little time or experience for analyzing captured material. On
the other hand, since 1939 the British had acquired considerable expertise in
this area. The Air Ministry included a technical intelligence section that
contained both a technical staff and crash officers, the latter being individually
responsible for a given area of the British Isles. When an enemy plane crashed,
the crash officer went immediately to the scene, assessed what technical aspects
he could, and immediately questioned any downed enemy airmen.
In October 1942, Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, AAF Director of Military
Requirements, had asked intelligence to focus on likely German counterstrikes
to allow the AAF to change equipment and tactics before such enemy actions
could take their toll. “It appears obvious,” Fairchild said, “that the success or
failure of our European offensive may depend to a large degree upon the ability
of our intelligence services, both in Great Britain and in the United States to
anticipate well in advance any changes in the German strategy, tactics, and
eq~ipment.”~~ To assist in implementing a program to address Fairchild’s
concerns, Squadron Leader A. W. Colley, an experienced RAF technical
intelligence officer on detached duty to HQ AAF, arrived in 1942 at Air
MatCriel Command at Wright Field to help organize an air technical intelligence
(ATI) course. This course taught candidates how to prepare initial pro formu
evaluation reports and how to determine what captured material should be
forwarded for more detailed analysis within the theater or at Wright Field. By
the end of March 1943, thirty-three Air Forces officers and ten Navy officers
had graduated from the AT1 course. Upon graduation, the officers went to
Washington for ten days of indoctrination in A-2 before going to overseas
theaters. Meanwhile, the British continued to carry the burden of crash
intelligence in both the European and Pacific theater^.^'
In the Southwest Pacific, AAFSWPA initiated active crash intelligence in
Australia, although few Japanese aircraft were available for study because most
had fallen into the ocean. The pro formu report worked out by the Allied Air
Forces was eventually adopted by AC/AS, Intelligence for standard use
throughout the AAF. One Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officer with
practical engineering experience maintained a roving crash inspection
headquarters in New Guinea. On one occasion, three Type 99 Val fighters
located after the Japanese abandoned them were dismantled and shipped to
Brisbane for examination. The Fifth Air Force also tried to obtain intelligence
from nameplates on equipment, but since initially no American air officer or
enlisted man was capable of translating Japanese, RAAF and British Army
personnel had to perform this function.43
To improve both the value of technical intelligence and the attention paid
to it, in June 1943 Sorenson wrote to the commanding general of each USAAF
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