Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Taking the Offensive
information on towns and regions that were pro-Allies or proJapanese, the
locations of OSS agent teams and covert OSS airstrips, and other places where
rescue would be likely or possible. Once an aircrew was known to be down,
their commander sent their general location to detachment headquarters, which
in turn alerted its agents in the vicinity to begin a search. Occasionally, trained
OSS people parachuted into the jungle to guide lost airmen to safety. By mid-
September 1944, Detachment 101 teams had aided more than 180 Tenth Air
Force airmen in
To better coordinate rescues in Burma and Thailand, in April 1944 the
Allies combined their escape and evasion functions in the India and Southeast
Asia commands into what they called the E Group. E Group had roots in the
area going back to men who had escaped from Hong Kong in 1942. The unit
subsumed the MIS-X and M.I.9 work of the Southeast Asia, India, East, and
South Africa commands and the Eastern Fleet, but it worked primarily in the
Southeast Asia regions, where the fighting gave it the most opportunity to show
its combined skills. The new organization was similar to one used in Europe;
it kept close liaison with Detachment 101, Force 136, and air-sea rescue, and it
was responsible for all escape and evasion training of ground, sea, and air
forces. In addition, E Group organized and implemented all arrangements for
contacting or effecting the release of POWs or evaders in enemy territ~ry.~'
E Group's commander was a British officer; his deputy was an American.
The small staff totaled but thirteen officers, about equally drawn from the
armies and air forces in the area, with a number of enlisted radio operators and
administrative workers. As the size of E Group indicated, the organization did
not itself operate large numbers of rescue teams or stations. Primarily, E Group,
in addition to its extensive training efforts, took reports of lost aircraft and
arranged with the most appropriate Allied force to complete the rescue or
recovery of the men d~wned.~'
As the Allied airmen fashioned their ground target selection process, they
also paid a great deal of attention to the enemy's air defenses. From crew
reports, photography, and agent reports, officers plotted the locations of gun
sites. Suspected radar locations were collected into a similar listing. Radar
station plots became more accurate as the XX Bomber Command began flying
ferret missions in the summer of 1944. By October 1944, the AFF had elaborate
networks that intercepted Japanese air traffic control radio messages, analyzed
their source and content, and reported to British and American commanders the
activities of the Japanese Army Air Force. By tracking Japanese air operations
and aircraft strength at various places, General Stratemeyer at EAC headquar-
ters and his subordinate air commanders could readily anticipate Japanese
reactions to Allied operations?'
Y-Service radio intercept collection for the air forces in India-Burma was
primarily an RAF responsibility, done by wireless telegraph units at Comilla,
Chittagong, and Imphal. The AAF's 5th Radio Squadron (Mobile) was a
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