Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
section of HQ AAF A-2; Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier of the Air Unit in G-2’s
MID; and Maj. W. Barton Leach, a lawyer serving as an operations analyst
under Gates.IY4
The committee cast a broad net in its search for information. Within two
weeks, its members had divided potential enemy target systems into three
priorities according to their importance to the German war effort, their
vulnerability, and the timeliness of impact, and it formed subcommittees to
work on detailed studies of the German aircraft, oil, transportation, electric
power, coke, and rubber industries, as well as on an overall interpretation of the
western Axis economy. Eventually, committee members would address
nineteen German industries. In addition, a force requirements subcommittee was
to evaluate the resources necessary to achieve the destruction of whichever
targets the committee recommended.
In areas in which HQ AAF A-2 had already done considerable work, most
notably in electric power, oil, transportation, and rubber, the committee drew
heavily upon these sources. Other agencies and organizations that provided
material included the BEW, the Army’s G-2, the OSS, the Departments of
Commerce and State, the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical
Engineers, and the Administrator of Export Control. Reports from the MEW
and the Air Ministry, already being sent to the British Embassy in Washington,
were made available to the subcommittees. In addition to already completed
studies and collected materials, the subcommittees called upon industrialists,
economists, and financiers from America and abroad with expertise in key
industries. In several instances, these men had actually operated factories in the
targeted industries in Europe and Africa.”’ For example, information on the
ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt came from individuals who had worked for
SKF, the Swedish firm that had owned these plants prior to their takeover by the
German govemment.lY6
To acquire additional data and gain an operational perspective, Perera,
Leach, Hamilton, and Root flew to England in late January 1943. They were
greeted with frosty suspicion and concerns that their task involved potential
security breaches, duplication of effort, and would impose an undue burden on
the British, with whom Eighth Air Force had established close ties. American
planners and intelligence officers in the United Kingdom also feared Washing-
ton was trying to assume a function-the collection and assessment of
intelligence-which was better performed in the United Kingdom. It appeared
that this group, especially through the force requirements subcommittee, was
attempting to make operational judgments that were the prerogative of operators
and planners.’” To resolve some of the apprehensions, committee representa-
tives agreed that their final report would not address specific force requirements
or “operational factors which were particularly in the province of the Eighth Air
Force. . .
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