Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
on doing things their way.23 Still wedded to an untried doctrine, they believed
that British bomber formations had never achieved the critical mass required to
defend themselves.
American air operations over the continent in summer and fall 1942 rarely
moved beyond the framework of a protecting cloak of RAF fighters. Ira Eaker
was claiming by late fall that experiences thus far indicated the B-17 could
“cope with the German day fighter.” On the basis of the first 1,100 sorties, he
argued, German fighters were no match for close formations of American
bombers; losses on the bombing missions onto the continent had averaged only
1.6 percent. What Eaker failed to mention was that most of those missions had
enjoyed heavy fighter support; in raids flown beyond fighter range or when no
diversionary efforts were flown, the attacking bombers had suffered a loss rate
of 6.4 percent, and no missions had yet flown over German territory.” Yet
American intelligence estimates seem to have supported Eaker in his belief that
the answer to the problems involved in penetrating deep into the Reich would
only require formations consisting of ten bomber groups. In particular, the
Americans believed that the Luftwuffe had thinned its forces along the outer
perimeter of Fortress Europe and that, once past this defensive system, their
bomber formations would have a relatively easy time over Germany.
These early Eighth Air Force missions raised two important issues, one
dealing with the analysis of intelligence and how doctrinal “belief” clouded
judgments; the other, with technological assessments. American air intelligence
was hardly an effective or efficient organization at this time; one can wonder
how much clout it enjoyed with operational commanders. Not surprisingly, it
provided no suggestion that American doctrine might be fundamentally flawed.
First, experience thus far in the war suggested that deep penetration bomber
raids into Germany would have substantial problems unless they were defended
by escorting fighters. Intelligence analysts did not argue this point. This state
of affairs underlined one of the major difficulties confronting AAF intelligence
organizations: their general unwillingness to involve themselves in critiques of
the doctrine and performance of their own forces. To do so would probably have
involved them in serious disputes with their operational masters. Not doing so
may have resulted in needless losses of aircraft and aircrews in both Europe and
the Pacific.
The second issue has more to do with technological assessment than with
intelligence. Reinforced by the silence of intelligence and operations on
questions of basic doctrine, a disastrous effect was the near loss of the daylight
strategic bombing campaign. British and American airmen did not believe that
a long-range fighter with suitable air-to-air capabilities could be constructed to
escort bombers on deep penetration raids into Germany. Churchill had
suggested to the Chief of Air Staff in 1941 that long-range escort fighters might
be aconsiderable boon to Bomber Command; Portal, perhaps basing his opinion
on the performance of the deficient German Me 1 10 during the Battle of Britain
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