Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Early Intelligence Organization
1940, Carl Spaatz, now a full colonel, had a first-hand view of some of the
heaviest fighting of the Lu@affe blitz against England. He quickly concluded
“that the Germans had developed ‘a mass of air geared to the Army’ which was
not going to . . . prevail against the ‘real air power’ developed by the British.”
Unfortunately, Spaatz noted, the British had committed themselves to shortrange
planes only to find they needed long-range bombers.”’ By December
1940, the number of U.S. Army special observers sent abroad on various tasks
had reached twenty officers, half of them from the Air More followed
the next year.
In the face of these extensive activities, Arnold proposed in July 1941 that
Air Corps officers on attach6 or mission duty be designated military air
attach&, to be appointed through G-2 but to act as collectors of air intelligence.
Special intelligence missions were to be assigned only after it was ascertained
whether G-2 might have the desired intelligence. In cases of military necessity,
the commander of the AAF would have the right to collect necessary air
intelligence without consulting G-2. Arnold also requested that A-2 maintain
direct liaison with foreign air attach& in the United States and that all cables
concerning air matters be forwarded by G-2 to AAF Headquarters as soon as
decoded and before being processed.114
In response to General Arnold’s paper, General Miles complained to the
Chief of Staff that work being done by A-2 was contrary to Amy regulations.
Miles’s memo of August 11, 1941, said that Arnold’s contentions presented “a
perfect picture of dual intelligence, a picture of two offices, largely duplicating
each other’s work and yet independent as to the results obtained-a picture of
parallel lines, meeting nowhere.” In rebuttal, Arnold denied that duplication and
divergent studies and estimates would result from his proposals, which were not
intended to take away G-2’s prerogatives, but were meant to speed up obtaining
timely and adequate information necessary for technical, tactical, and strategic
planning in the AAF. Early in September, General Scanlon had studied
applicable Army regulations and pointed out that while MID was charged with
general intelligence duties and supervision of intelligence, nothing appeared to
prevent other agencies performing the same duties under MID supervision.l15
The War Department issued its command decision delineating intelligence
responsibilities on September 10,1941. The decision stated that the responsibility
imposed on MID for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating military
information pertained to the AAF as well as to other arms. The MID was
charged with compiling information for comprehensive military studies and
with preparing such studies and estimates. AAF intelligence agencies were to
compile and evaluate technical and tactical information received from MID and
other sources, plus collect technical air intelligence from sources abroad
through cooperation with MID. All of these types of information were required
by the AAF for their development and for such operations as they might be
directed to perform.116 The War Department delineation disappointed Scanlon,
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