Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The Pacific and Far East
Guinea from Rabaul, and Kenney’s worry about Japanese air power potential
made him closely watch air intelligence reports that he could use to best
advantage. Telling Whitehead to continue with preparations, Kenney returned
to Brisbane to prepare for a trip to Washington where he and Sutherland were
to meet with the JCS and the representatives of other Pacific commands to
discuss Pacific strategy. While preparing for the trip, Kenney told MacArthur
of the state of preparations for the attack; he also worried about the weather,
which had blocked any reconnaissance sightings that day.38
On March 1, the convoy passed out of the heavy weather. Late in the
afternoon, a B-24’s crew once again saw it. The next day, a series of high- and
low-level attacks by the Americans and Australians, followed by Navy PT
boats, destroyed the Japanese ships. Kenney and Whitehead had hit the convoy
exactly where they had planned, off Finschhaven. They sent their men in under
the expected Japanese air cover and achieved complete surprise. All eight of the
cargo ships burned and sank in the two days of fighting. By the time Navy PT
boats mopped up, four of the original eight destroyer escorts had escaped.
Subsequent Japanese messages indicated that they may have rescued as many
as 4,500 soldiers, most landing in New Guinea. Those who survived reached
Lae without food or equipment, where they faced eventual tarv vat ion.^'
Kenney and MacArthur claimed a much higher toll of Japanese ships based
on the conflicting report of the aircrews. The original Fifth Air Force estimate
was that as many as fourteen merchantmen had been destroyed with troop losses
exceeding 12,000. Continued scrutiny of enemy radio messages and translations
of documents captured later in the year at Lae reduced the total in both
categories, but the full information remained secret for some time. In March
1943 MacArthur and Kenney were exultant. MacArthur, flush with the adroit
use of intelligence analysis, made the very most of the victory in his communi-
que. Japan’s military leaders were shocked, for they expected at worst that half
of the convoy would get through. Although the Japanese lost most of an infantry
division, the battle itself was far more significant for its long-term effects on
American air operations in the region. Kenney left for the Washington meeting
at dawn on March 4. When he arrived there he was no longer a minor air
commander in an isolated and neglected theater; he was the most important
AAF hero since the Doolittle raid on Japan the year before. On landing,
Generals Marshall and Arnold met and congratulated him. Later that month his
picture appeared on the cover of Life magazine:’ The outcome of Kenney’s
reading of the Japanese messages was to go well beyond congratulations,
greatly affecting the size and prestige of the AAF in the SPA and SWPA.
Called to the White House on March 17, Kenney told President Roosevelt
about the Southwest Pacific Theater. Answering Roosevelt’s questions, Kenney
said he needed more airplanes, crews, and supplies if he were to continue the
war at the present pace. A few days before, Kenney had made such a pitch to
Arnold. “No,” said the commanding general and his staff; virtually the entire
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