Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
future, only Canada, the United Kingdom, and the USSR posed a threat to
America. Martin dismissed Canada and Great Britain as benevolent, presenting
no serious problem. The USSR was another story. Having interned at least two
B-29s that had landed in Siberia before their entry into the war against Japan,
the Soviets could use the aircraft as patterns for similar aircraft of their own,
Based upon American design and manufacturing experiences with the B-29,
Colonel Martin predicted that in no less than five years the Soviets would have
between 50 and 100 such airplanes operational.’*
In mid-November of 1945, the G-2 office sent A-2 an estimate of probable
developments that might require the use of U.S. forces in the next five to fifteen
years. Prominent in the discussion within that report was the emerging conflict
between the USSR and the Western Allies. In defining the factors that
constituted a threat to the United States, the G-2 analysts drew disturbing
parallels between the Soviet activity, both prewar and postwar, and the trends
of prewar German actions, including rigid police states, absolute political
control, occupation of or attacks upon foreign neighbors (for the USSR, this
included the Baltic States, Finland, and Poland), closed economies, and
exporting political doctrine inimical to democratic proce~ses.’~
The report also noted that the war had placed the USSR in a position where
from five to fifteen years might be required for the Soviet Union to develop its
war-making capability to the point that it could directly threaten the United
States. The assessment concluded that a potentially unfriendly Soviet strategic
air force would not emerge until about 1950 to 1955 and that the USSR could
take until 1960 to recoup its manpower and industrial losses of World War 11.
Thus, the immediate threat seemed small except for the nearly certain effort by
the USSR to push hard to develop a nuclear weapon. The analysts translated this
nuclear research and development into a five- to ten-year growth period. Of
overriding concern to military planning, according to the report’s conclusion,
was the lack of understanding by the American people of Soviet intentions. This
lack, and the wish of the people to demobilize, meant that little chance existed
for maintaining an American armed force able to cope with the clearest possible
danger the USSR presented: an ability to move west and occupy large amounts
of Europe. With this view of a mixed state of affairs, the AAF entered the
postwar period as an enormously strong organization, but as one rapidly
declining in size and ~apability.’~