Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
Even the knowledge gained in early December that Hitler had approved
conversion of ground-attack Me 262s to the fighter mode initially caused little
concern, since this was assumed to be a slow process.274
The stunning psychological shock of the Ardennes offensive and the
surprise aerial attack on Allied airfields the morning of January 1,1945, caused
a dramatic reassessment of the air situation by Allied intelligence. With the end
of the war no longer just over the horizon, developments that had seemed
unlikely now took on a different cast. The conversion of Me 262 ground-attack
aircraft to interceptors armed with four cannon was in itself cause forcon~ern.~~~
Even more disconcerting were reports from workers and officials at the jet
production facilities at Strasbourg and a long decrypt from the Japanese naval
attach6 on the intended scope of Me 262 The impact of this new
perspective was felt almost immediately. Before the end of December, the first
sixteen targets on the weekly Jockey list related to jet production, while the
daily airfield attack list emphasized facilities used for jet operations or
training.277 On December 29, McDonald forwarded to the deputy commander
for operations an Air Ministry estimate that the GAF possessed 100-125 Me
262s and the potential for 325-400 by April, with possible production of 250
per month from April through June.27g
In a memorandum to the commanding general, USSTAF, as the new year
opened, McDonald warned that jet fighters now constituted “a serious threat”
since “a staggering proportion” of German effort was being funneled into this
project. McDonald believed that if the war continued until summer, jet
interceptors could “completely upset the present balance of aerial power.” To
preclude this, the Allies had to initiate immediate countermeasures, even at the
expense of other target systems. These steps, a worried McDonald urged, should
include continued emphasis on oil (especially jet aviation fuel), attacks on jet
production facilities wherever they were suspected, and (in contrast to his own
opposition to attacks on airfields generally) operations against German airfields
used for jet testing, training, and operations. The Eighth and Fifteenth Air
Forces, the intelligence chief concluded, must “be given unequivocal directive
to place German jet targets on a priority second only to
Responding to the threat, one week later General Spaatz made jet fighters
“primary objectives for attack.” Writing to Arnold, he noted that while his
January 16 directive addressed several target systems, the primary change was
“the restoration of the G.A.F. and primarily that of its jet aircraft production,
training and operational establishments. . . .” As justification for his decision,
with which the Air Staff apparently did not agree, Spaatz repeated the figures
McDonald had provided on the potential growth of the German jet fighter force
by summer.28o Despite the flurry of concern, actual operations against jet
facilities did not increase significantly; two-thirds of the heavy bomber attacks
in January continued in direct support of land operations (principally against rail
targets and ammunition depots). The following month, as part of a massive
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