Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
slowly and with several diversions began the air campaign that would ultimately
contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany. In North Africa, from November
1942 to May 1943, American air forces not only supported Allied armies
directly through close air support, but they engaged in counterair, interdiction,
and air transport operations. In the Southwest Pacific, General Kenney’s Fifth
Air Force pioneered innovative employment of land-based air power in support
of both land and sea forces. At the end of a logistics train more than halfway
around the globe, Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force and its
predecessors would constitute almost the entire American force in China, while
Tenth Air Force operated from India against the Japanese in remote Burma.
As the AAF prepared for and then went into combat, it had to build, train,
equip, and employ units simultaneously. In the case of air intelligence, the AAF
lacked not only resources and experience but also clear ideas of what intelligence
was supposed to do and how best to do it. The months from January 1942
through the spring of 1943 marked the real birth of American AAF air
intelligence. During this period, the development of intelligence organizations
occurred at all levels, from HQ AAF in Washington to the combat squadrons in
the field, and it saw the introduction of the first air intelligence training
program. As in other aspects of the air war, U.S. airmen benefited from the
experience and guidance of their British counterparts in air intelligence.
Circumstances precluded simply adopting RAF organizations and procedures
as such, even in Europe. The variety of demands and conditions confronted in
the global war meant that all aspects of intelligence had to be adapted to the
unique circumstances of each theater. The requirements as well as the resources
Generals Spaatz and Eaker found in Europe were in many respects quite
different from those Generals Nathan Twining, Kenney, Chennault, or Clayton
Bissell faced in the Pacific and in Asia.
The evolution and use of intelligence reflected the strains and potential
benefits of joint and combined operations. Not surprisingly, debate over force
structure, resource allocation, and operational responsibilities among the U.S.
services did not cease with the declaration of war. Often, coordination and
agreement on issues was easier between similar services within the Anglo-
American alliance than it was among the services of a single nation, particularly
the United States. This was as true with respect to intelligence as it was to the
allocation of resources or to the conduct of operations.
Under the constant pressures of planning, executing, and evaluating air
operations, the weaknesses of prewar air intelligence within the AAF quickly
became obvious. In its opening phase, for example, the daylight, precision
bombing campaign over occupied Europe revealed the enormity of the demands
this doctrine would make on intelligence. A greater awareness of the importance
of intelligence drove the development of new organizations, new approaches,
and new capabilities. Indicative of the revolution in air intelligence was the
increase in the types of sources, including those such as ULTRA, unknown to
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