Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
headed an Air Estimates and Objective Folders Unit under the Operations
Planning Branch.Io3
The OCAC Intelligence Division assumed a broad interpretation of what
was meant by technical evaluation. Air intelligence considered General Strong’s
October 5,1939, memo a War Department directive; the G-2 regarded it as only
a suggestion. Early in 1941, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the G-2, objected to a
ten-page paper that Hansell had written, “Basis for Intelligence for an Air
Estimate of the Situation-Europe.’’ Miles claimed that the MID was responsi-
ble for evaluating comprehensive intelligence information; the intelligence
section of an arm or service was authorized only to make technical evaluations
of information pertinent to that arm or service. Refereeing the difference, the
head of the W D, Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, himself an air officer, ruled
that the Air Corps study was a technical evaluation. He added that air objective
folders prepared by Air Corps intelligence were also technical evaluations, even
though they might be filled with considerations of the economic or political
value of a target.lw McNarney’s opinion favoring the Air Corps’ intelligence
office seems to have been a very broadly based decision. It may have been
rendered out of loyalty to his colleagues, but it certainly pointed out the wide
rift between air intelligence in the Air Corps and the G-2.
When the G-2 asked the Chief of Staff to overturn McNarney’s ruling, the
Air Corps rebuttal demanded that “not only should all information possessed by
the MID be made available, but that no hindrance should exist to the collection
of additional information by the personnel of the Intelligence Division, Office,
Chief of Air Corps, from sources within the United States.” Upon seeing these
demands signed by Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Acting Chief of Air Corps,
General Miles notified the Chief of Staff on June 12, 1941, that serious
duplication existed in practically all phases of military intelligence and that the
Air Corps’ actions would continue such duplication unless intelligence
responsibilities were promptly delineated. A quick decision was necessary
because a major reorganization of the Air Corps was in process and specific
intelligence functions ought to be cleared up before a new HQ AAF was
e~tab1ished.l’~
As Chief of Air Corps and Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air after
October 1940, Arnold was already aware of the muddle in air intelligence when
he became commanding general of the newly established AAF on June 20,
1941. According to Hansell, Truman Smith, after his return from Germany in
1940, informed Arnold of many details regarding the Luftwafle and German
aircraft production, information about which Arnold was unaware but which the
G-2 already knew. Arnold, surprised and unhappy with news that he considered
important to Air Corps planning and operations, went to see General Miles.
Miles informed him that since the Chief of Air Corps was not a member of the
WDGS, he was not eligible to see such sensitive information. That was too
much for Hap Arnold, who went to see General Marshall to get added authority
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